专栏作者面对一个恃强凌弱的中国，佩洛西不应退缩The Last Thing We Needed Was Pelosi Backing Down From a BullyBRET STEPHENS2022年8月3日 CHIANG YING-YING/ASSOCIATED PRESSNancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan carries undeniable risks. 南希·佩洛西访问台湾存在不可否认的风险。 Beijing could respond by harassing U.S. Navy ships and aircraft in the area, with a distinct potential for collision or confrontation. It could seize the (largely demilitarized) Taiwanese island of Kinmen — better known to aficionados of the Cold War as Quemoy — which lies just a few miles off the Fujian coast. It could lend Moscow a hand in the war in Ukraine, perhaps by selling it the kinds of precision munitions the Russian military is reportedly running low on. 北京可以通过袭扰该地区的美国海军舰艇和飞机作为回应，很可能发生冲撞或对抗。中国可以夺取（很大程度上已非军事化的）台湾金门岛（该地通常被冷战迷们称为Quemoy，离福建海岸只有几公里）。中国可以在乌克兰战争中帮助莫斯科，也许会通过向其出售精密制导武器的方式，据报道，俄罗斯军队的此类武器已经所剩不多。 A month ago, all of this might have added up to a plausible, if not exactly convincing, argument for the speaker of the House to skip Taiwan during her Asian tour, at least while the United States contends with other crises. But after her visit was effectively announced, it would have been catastrophic to back down. 一个月前，所有这些说法可能都是众议院议长——在美国应对其他危机之际——应在亚洲之行中跳过台湾的合理论点，即使并不是完全令人信服。但在相当于宣布了行程后，退缩将是灾难性的。 Bullies often seek tests of strengths to probe for signs of weakness. And they always read efforts at conciliation as evidence of capitulation. 欺凌者经常寻求力量测试，以探查弱点的迹象。他们总是将调解努力视为投降的证据。 That’s what’s happening now. “To win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill,” Sun Tzu wrote. “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” If Beijing had gotten its way over something as seemingly minor as Pelosi’s visit, it would not have been merely a symbolic victory in a diplomatic sideshow. It would have changed the rules of the game. Rather than avert a diplomatic crisis, it would have hastened a strategic disaster: the further isolation of a democratic U.S. ally and key economic partner as a prelude to surrender, war or both. 现在的情况就是这样。孙子说：“是故百战百胜，非善之善者也；不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也。”如果北京在像佩洛西访问这样看似微不足道的事情上得逞，那将不仅仅是在一场上不了台面的外交活动中获得象征性胜利。它将会改变游戏规则。它不会阻止外交危机的发生，反而会加速一场战略灾难：进一步孤立一个民主的美国盟友和主要经济伙伴，作为投降、战争或两者兼有的局面的前奏。 What happens next? Let’s first recap where we were. 接下来发生什么？让我们先回顾一下我们所处的位置。 Members of Congress have been visiting Taiwan for decades. In May, Senator Tammy Duckworth, Democrat of Illinois, led a congressional delegation and met with President Tsai Ing-wen. Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, led a bipartisan delegation in April. None of these sparked any kind of crisis. 几十年来，一直有国会议员访台。5月，伊利诺伊州民主党参议员塔米·达克沃斯率领国会代表团会见蔡英文总统。南卡罗来纳州共和党参议员林赛·格雷厄姆于4月率领一个两党代表团访台。这些都没有引发任何形式的危机。 In 1997, then-Speaker Newt Gingrich visited Taipei, stopping first in Beijing, where he warned his hosts that the United States would defend Taiwan militarily if it was attacked. “We never got into an argument,” Gingrich said at the time. “They never said, ‘Well, you can’t have that right — that’s interference.’ They said, ‘OK, noted.’ And then they basically would say: ‘Since we don’t intend to attack, you won’t have to defend. Let’s go on and talk about how we’re going to get this thing solved.’ And I think that’s very healthy.” 1997年，时任议长纽特·金里奇访问台北，先去了北京，当时他警告东道国，如果台湾遭到袭击，美国将进行军事保卫。“我们从未发生争执，”金里奇当时说。“他们从来没有说过，‘你没有这种权利——这是干涉内政。’他们说，‘好吧，知道了。’然后他们大概会说：‘既然我们不打算进攻，你就没有必要保卫。让我们继续谈谈这个问题怎么解决。’我认为这是非常健康的。” These visits all took place under diplomatic understandings that have governed U.S.-China-Taiwan relations since the 1970s: the one-China policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. But as China has felt its power rise — and sensed American power and resolve wane — it has written a new playbook: Make outrageous legal claims, turn alleged provocations into useful pretexts, take incremental but increasingly aggressive steps and use force only as a psychologically crushing last blow. 这些访问都是在自1970年代以来主导美中台湾关系的外交谅解下进行的：“一个中国”政策和《与台湾关系法》。但随着中国感受到自身实力的崛起——并感觉到美国的实力和决心减弱——它编写了一个新的规则：提出荒谬的法律主张，将所谓的挑衅变成有用的借口，采取渐进但越来越激进的步骤，并仅将武力用作压垮心理的致命一击。 This is how it imposed dictatorial control over Hong Kong. It’s how it is gradually gaining military dominion in the South China Sea. It is how it is seeking to undermine Japan’s sovereignty over some of its outlying islands. 这就是它对香港实行独裁控制的方式。这就是它在南海逐渐获得军事统治权的方式。这就是它试图破坏日本对其一些离岛的主权的方式。 And it’s the approach it now appears to be using with Taiwan. Given the loss of face Beijing will believe it has suffered from Pelosi’s visit, you can expect that it will ratchet up the intimidation factor without risking outright war. Kinmen is ringed by islets that China could easily take as a show of force. 现在，这似乎就是它对台湾使用的手段。鉴于北京会认为自己因佩洛西的访问而丢失颜面，你可以预期它会加大恐吓因素，但不会冒开战的风险。金门周围有一些小岛，中国可以轻松夺取它们，作为一种武力的展示。 What should the U.S. do then? Don’t back down. 那美国该怎么办？不要退缩。 1. Congressional delegations ought to arrive in Taiwan every week for the next year. Make them so routine that Beijing forgets to protest. 1. 国会代表团明年应每周抵达台湾。访台变得如此常规，以至于北京会忘记抗议。 2. President Biden should formally state what he has said repeatedly off the cuff: that the United States will intervene militarily if China seeks to invade Taiwan. He can underscore the point with frequent transits of U.S. Navy ships through the Taiwan Strait, along with an expansion of the secretive joint training exercises that U.S. and Taiwanese special-operations forces have already conducted. 2. 拜登总统多次未加思索地表示，如果中国寻求入侵台湾，美国将进行军事干预，他应该对这句话做出正式陈述。他可以通过美国海军舰艇频繁通过台湾海峡以及扩大美国和台湾特种作战部队已经进行的秘密联合训练演习来强调这一点。 3. The United States can also provide Taiwan with the kind of easily dispersed, easily hidden, asymmetric weapons that have done such damage to the Russians: Javelin anti-tank missiles, Switchblade “kamikaze” drones, Stinger antiaircraft missiles, naval-strike antiship missiles. 3. 美国还可以向台湾提供那些重创俄罗斯的武器，这些是容易分散、容易隐藏的不对称武器：标枪反坦克导弹、弹簧刀“自杀式”无人机、毒刺防空导弹、海军打击反舰导弹。 4. Biden should propose sharp increases in military spending, particularly for the Navy, which now ranks behind China’s in terms of ship numbers. It would have bipartisan support both as an industrial policy and as a measure of global security. 4. 拜登应该提议大幅增加军费开支，尤其是现在在舰艇数量方面落后于中国的海军。这不仅是一项产业政策，也是一项全球安全措施，将得到两党的支持。 With luck, China will accept that the ultimate costs of confrontation vastly outweigh the benefits. It’s a lesson Vladimir Putin may have learned — albeit only after he invaded Ukraine and at a tragic price for the world. The key to saving Taiwan is to get that point across to Beijing now, before they blunder into similar tragedy. Cheers to Pelosi for standing firm. 运气好的话，中国会接受对抗的最终成本大大超过收益的事实。这是弗拉基米尔·普京可能已经吸取的教训——尽管只是在他入侵乌克兰并为世界付出了悲惨的代价之后。拯救台湾的关键是现在把这些意思传达给北京，以免他们犯下类似的悲剧。为佩洛西的坚定立场干杯。 Bret Stephens自2017年4月起担任《纽约时报》观点与评论版面的专栏作家。他于2013年在《华尔街日报》工作时获普利策评论奖，此前还曾担任《耶路撒冷邮报》主编。欢迎在Facebook上关注他。 翻译：纽约时报中文网 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道佩洛西访问台湾立法会，与蔡英文会面2022年8月3日 佩洛西访台，恐引发美中紧张对峙2022年8月2日 佩洛西的中国“往事”2022年8月3日 北京将如何应对佩洛西访台行程？2022年8月2日 为什么佩洛西的访台计划不负责任2022年8月2日 最受欢迎中国真的能“武统”台湾吗？ 佩洛西访问台湾立法院，与蔡英文会面 为什么佩洛西的访台计划无比鲁莽、不负责任 面对一个恃强凌弱的中国，佩洛西不应退缩 台湾人如何看待佩洛西访台行程？ 佩洛西抵达台湾，美国官员25年来对台最高级别访问 若佩洛西访台成行，北京如何应对？ 佩洛西访台唤醒台海危机记忆 佩洛西的中国“往事”：曾现身天安门声援“六四”死难者 “政治雷区”：为何佩洛西拟议中的访台行程如此敏感 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2022 The New York Times Company.