中国坚定扩大对外开放，西方对华“脱钩”难以实现2023年3月31日, 20:11 © AFP 2023 / GREG BAKER 俄罗斯卫星通讯社 （北京分社） 所有资料 评论 中国总理李强周四在博鳌亚洲论坛上表示，不论世界发生什么样的变化，中国都将始终坚持改革开放。中国专家在接受俄罗斯卫星通讯社采访时指出，在世界形势更加复杂、少数西方国家推动对华“脱钩”的背景下，中国表明将坚持对外开放的立场将大大提振世界经济的信心，扩大开放符合经济发展规律，所谓对华“脱钩断链”是缺乏现实基础的政治噪音，不可能实现。 中国国务院总理李强30日在海南博鳌出席博鳌亚洲论坛2023年年会开幕式，并发表题为《以人类命运共同体理念为引领　为世界和平与发展注入更多确定性》的主旨演讲。 李强表示，中国一定会用和平和发展的方式使14亿多人口整体迈进现代化社会，这将为亚洲和世界经济增长带来强劲动能。完成这个中心任务，需要长时间的持续奋斗。在这个过程中，不论世界发生什么样的变化，我们都将始终坚持改革开放、创新驱动，既为整个世界经济发展不断注入新的动力和活力，也让世界各国分享中国发展的机遇和红利。 李强还强调，我们将在扩大市场准入、优化营商环境、保障项目落地等方面推出新的举措，不断优化国企敢干、民企敢闯、外企敢投的制度环境。我们有信心有能力推动中国经济的巨轮乘风破浪、行稳致远，为世界经济发展作出更大贡献。 此外，本周李强还在北京向包括苹果公司首席执行官蒂姆•库克（Tim Cook）在内的外企高管表示，中国将进一步扩大开放。李强强调，中国发展离不开世界，世界发展也需要中国。无论国际形势如何变化，中国都将坚定不移扩大对外开放。中国开放的大门会越来越大，环境会越来越好，服务会越来越优。 外企代表都表示，未来将继续与中国深化合作。中国的成功就是全球跨国企业的成功。相信中国会继续扩大开放，为世界经济发展作出重大贡献，相信中国将拥有光明的未来。 中国人民大学重阳金融研究院高级研究员贾晋京在接受卫星通讯社采访时指出，中国是全球最重要的市场，世界经济的市场结构决定了中国一定会坚定不移地扩大开放。中方将不断提高对外开放的质量和水平，让资金、人员等的流动性增强，推动经济实现高质量发展。 贾晋京表示，中方近期多次发出将坚定开放的声音一方面是表明将以更开放的姿态拥抱世界的态度，另一方面也是告诉少数西方国家，经济全球化是不可逆转的历史潮流，中国经济已经与世界经济深度融合，孤立中国的企图不可能实现。 贾晋京说：“虽然全世界在宏观方面出现了一些不确定因素，但是市场经济的规律是客观的，全球经济仍朝着深化分工的方向继续发展。中国在这时候发出扩大开放的声音阐明了全球经济的发展趋势，这是一个客观事实。全球市场是作为一个整体在运作的，中国市场是其中一个环节。少数西方国家主张跟中国‘脱钩断链’是一种噪音，它不符合客观规律，所以根本实现不了。” 中国国家主席习近平26日向中国发展高层论坛2023年年会致贺信。习近平指出，当前，世界百年未有之大变局加速演进，局部冲突和动荡频发，世界经济复苏动力不足。促进复苏需要共识与合作。中国提出全球发展倡议，得到国际社会的广泛支持和积极响应。中国将坚持对外开放的基本国策，坚定奉行互利共赢的开放战略，不断以中国新发展为世界提供新机遇。中国将稳步扩大规则、规制、管理、标准等制度型开放，推动各国各方共享制度型开放机遇。 博鳌论坛2023 专家：美国对华“科技战”脱离现实并疏远全球 3月29日, 11:17 中国 博鳌亚洲论坛 经济发展 评论 俄罗斯卫星通讯社 中国 俄罗斯 国际 俄中关系 评论 多媒体 播客 经济 军事 科技 体育 娱乐 WeChatWeibo 关于我们 资料使用条款 反馈 © 2023 Sputnik(卫星社) 所有权利均受保护 京ICP备2020045094号-1 18+ 新闻时间线 0

中美玄学境观察 2012事件 铁血往事

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 中美玄学境观察 2012事件 铁血往事

鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 中美玄学境观察

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 中美玄学境观察

鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 鸿儒私塾 侯波自传三部曲 风乎舞雩吾与点 孰与仲多吾与毛 东堂西馆吾与习

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 鸿儒私塾 侯波自传三部曲 风乎舞雩吾与点 孰与仲多吾与毛 东堂西馆吾与习

鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 鸿儒馆欢迎日本精英

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 鸿儒馆欢迎日本精英

台湾总统蔡英文在纽约获颁全球领导力奖方冰 2023年3月31日 06:57 周四（3月30日），台湾总统蔡英文在纽约获美国知名智库哈德逊研究所颁发“全球领导力奖”（global leadership award）。 “她以极大的勇气和清醒的决心领导了一个充满活力的民主国家，以抵制暴政并维护一个自由开放的印太地区。” 哈德逊研究所在一份新闻稿中说。 “我们很荣幸接待蔡总统。 在她的领导下，美国和台湾扩大并深化了安全和经济关系。”哈德逊研究所主席兼首席执行官约翰·沃尔特斯在声明中说。“我们为美国与台湾站在一起感到自豪。哈德逊研究所仍然坚定不移地促进美国及其盟国的安全、自由和繁荣。” 颁奖仪式周四晚在曼哈顿中城的州际酒店举行。包括美国前总统里根、参议员麦凯恩等很多美国著名政治人物都曾获得过这个年度奖。 蔡英文此行是前往台湾仅存的13个邦交国中的两个——危地马拉和伯利兹访问而过境纽约的。她在结束中南美洲的访问后将过境洛杉矶。美国众议院议长麦卡锡和其他国会议员计划与蔡英文在那里会面。对此中国国台办已经表示，如果麦卡锡会见蔡英文，中国将进行“坚决反击”。 但与会的哈德逊研究所中国中心主任余茂春表示，有关她是否会与麦卡锡见面的问题“整个晚上都没有冒出来。” 蔡英文在纽约的两天活动，尽管基本上都是闭门形式，但亲北京侨团组织的抗议人群如影随形。周四，尽管蔡英文和与会者均未在酒店正门出入，酒店马路对面拉横幅、举五星旗的抗议者用高音喇叭呼喊反台独反蔡英文的口号，并播放爱国歌曲。 “这在民主国家里并不奇怪。” 余茂春说。“但这没有意义。” 他表示：“台湾在世界人民心目中的形象越来越积极，而中国表现出的政治理念和手段却受到全世界民主国家人民的唾弃。 余茂春表示，蔡英文在获颁致辞时就美台人民的交流和友谊、双边技术和贸易的合作做了演讲。然后哈德逊研究所主席沃尔特斯（John Walters）主持了问答环节。 余茂春表示，在问答环节中最令他印象深刻的是，蔡英文提到了美台两个国家都享有的民主价值观，在台湾多样化环境中言论自由的重要性，并阐明了民主并非导致国家混乱，相反会加强国家的团结的道理。 这是美国之音的多媒体播放器。 当您选择一个伴随音频或视频的故事时，它在这里播放。 您可以随时查看原始故事或查找新故事，而无需通过在此页面上向下滑动来停止音频或视频。 通过从屏幕底部的圆形蓝色多媒体按钮向上滑动来再次打开此屏幕。 通过点击多媒体按钮启动和停止音频或视频。 安全访问已启动 设置

台北 — 中共2023年网络“清朗”行动出重拳整治所谓的“自媒体”造假造谣，声称这是为了要“推动形成良好的网络生态”，然而许多撼动社会的重大事件都是从自媒体爆料而来。中国的自媒体人对美国之音说，自媒体的谣言永远没有官媒多，自媒体带给社会的是一种完全不同于官媒的视角与见解，官方之所以想要严惩自媒体，是因为害怕外界看见真实的中国。 3月28日，中国国务院新闻办公室举行2023年“清朗”系列专项行动新闻发布会。中国国家网信办副主任牛一兵在发布会上介绍，此次专项行动重拳整治“自媒体”造谣传谣、恶意炒作、假冒仿冒、违规营利等突出问题，希望在“猛药去疴”的基础上，努力铲除自媒体乱象。 徐州“铁链女”- 然而，讽刺的是，不管是徐州铁链女事件，还是纪录上海封城的“四月之声”短片，又或是北京四通桥事件、“白纸运动”或“白发运动”等，都是经由自媒体传出后才被外界知晓，所以自媒体究竟是在制造假信息，还是揭开了外界难以窥探的真实中国？ 在四川经营部落格（博客）的自媒体工作者张先生在接受美国之音采访时表示，在很多重大事件中，自媒体爆的料其实都是真实的信息，相反地，中共对自媒体的批评其实是有其“历史”的。他说，中共在建国初期，为了要消灭资本主义，就把资本家讲得很坏很腐败；1979年在其宣称的对越南自卫反击战时，为了出兵越南，也把越南讲成是一个侵略扩张者；即使到了近代的八九学运，中共也把抗争的学生说成是受到了反动势力的鼓动...总之，中共宣称的很多事情跟实际上都是不符的。 2022年11月28日，在新冠病毒疫情持续扩散之际，北京民众为乌鲁木齐火灾遇难者守夜后，举着白纸抗议中共当局的封控限制。 他表示，中共整治自媒体的目的，是为了“不想让大家看到一个更真实的中国”，比如三月中旬，B站（哔哩哔哩）一名“Up主”（博主）上传了一支“随机找老年人购物，我来买单”的5分钟视频，随机采访了一名成都78岁的老人，但老人即使年事已高仍需外出打工，因为他每个月的农保仅107元人民币。该视频播出不久后，账号即被封禁，原因是它不小心真实呈现出了中国老人的生活窘况。 张先生说，自媒体的出现打破了官媒过去在社会上掌握发言权的垄断地位，现今人们获得信息的来源再也不会只依靠官媒，自媒体已成为人们日常生活中观看时事、了解热点、追查真相的主要渠道。 官媒谣言更多？ 他说，官媒天天新闻联播，永远保持政治正确的内容。但是，独立的自媒体有别于传统媒体，靠的是一己的良知、良心，为个人价值观判断发声，提供给社会的是一种完全不同于官媒的见解。他认为，自媒体没有官媒那种与生具来的责任，“它就是一种看见、发现”，所以即使自媒体的内容没有那么准确，也是可以被接受的。 “在我看来，自媒体的谣言永远没有官媒多”，张先生说。他表示，中国官媒几十年来掌握了话语权，从建国开始到文化大革命，特别是1957-1958年的大跃进时期，官媒谣言达到最高峰，出现了一些所谓的“亩产一万斤”、“亩产十万斤”等浮夸不实的言论。 但也有一些中国的自媒体工作者赞同中国官方的清朗行动。在河南主持一个油管频道的谢先生就对美国之音说，自媒体为了博眼球，总是以“新、奇、特”为目标，内容要新奇，角度要刁钻，表演要夸张，针对议题往往要从各种偏激极端的角度去做解读，才能吸引眼球，造成互联网生态鱼龙混杂，确实有必要治理。 鱼龙混杂 但谢先生也肯定民间自媒体在许多大事件中，补足了官方媒体的“缺位”。他说，自媒体透过每一次的信息传递，由下一个人对上一则信息进行纠偏或补充，从而让网民拼凑出一个相对完整与真实客观的信息，“但也有一些在大事发生的时候把整个舆论场搅浑，这也是客观存在的。” 他认为，总的来说，中国政府对自媒体的整顿是希望自媒体生态环境能够越来越好，而不是为了打压网络言论自由。 中国网信办在日前的记者会上公布去年清朗行动的成效，表示2022年组织开展了13项“清朗”专项行动，清理了违法和不良信息5430余万条，处置账号680余万个，下架APP、小程序2890余款，解散关闭群组、贴吧26万个，关闭网站7300多家，“有力维护网民合法权益”，并称今年的清朗行动“将认真贯彻落实党的二十大精神，以推动形成良好网络生态为工作目标。” 根据中国媒体报道，中国政府管理自媒体的方法包括督促平台健全自媒体账号管理体系、强化自媒体账号专业资质认证制度、指导网站平台建立健全自媒体粉丝数量管理与营利行为监管等制度机制等。 台湾香港协会理事长桑普。（桑普提供） 在油管经营“桑普频道”的香港政治评论员桑普在接受美国之音采访时表示，中共要严加取缔自媒体有两个目的：“一个是对于原有的那一些所谓的内容农场的一个规训，另外一个是对于一些自由声音、自由报道的一个打压，我觉得两个都有。” 规训内容农场 桑普表示，在中国可以被允许发声的自媒体其实有很多官方的操控在里面，这些自媒体专门充当中共的白手套，配合中共的大外宣政策，制造一些民族主义的亢奋术语来发大财，比如有人放出“郑州淹大水跟美国的气象武器有关”等假信息，发挥替中共进行认知作战的作用，而中共也允许自媒体利用政策宣传“涨粉”（增加粉丝），但中共又可以把散布假信息的责任甩锅给自媒体。 桑普说，另一种自媒体是中共给了政策以后，“会自己找事情来做”，比如中国著名的金融投资兼国际政经大V“黄生看金融”，在新冠疫情期间大肆渲染西方国家暗无天日，而中国又是取得多么伟大的成就时，同时私下贩售金融投资商品，最终倒台，这也是中共想要规管的对象。 中国特色自媒体 桑普说：“从一开始，中国的自媒体就是‘中国特色自媒体’，所以第一个他要针对的是对于一些‘吃共产党的饭，不要砸共产党的锅’的行为 。”也就是说，自媒体赚的钱一定要跟党的宗旨绑在一起，不能逾矩，这也是清朗行动的内涵里有一句“将自媒体营利收益与信息内容合规情况深度绑定”的真义。 “薇羽看世间”的中国播主陈薇羽（照片提供：陈薇羽） 在加拿大主持油管“薇雨看世间”的自频道博主陈薇羽在接受美国之音采访时表示，中共这次的清朗行动主要针对三大群体，第一个是党政军机关、事业单位以及官方媒体的特定账号，因为过去曾经发生过官方帐号发了一些奇怪的图片或是言论，来影射、讽刺中国领导人习近平。 她表示，按理说，中共体制内的账号应该是最被信任、不会出问题的，但现在竟然连这种账号也要开始认证、监管，“说明中共体制内已经出现很大的一种裂痕，至少是可以说是思想不统一，所以我认为他这个实际上是对中共内部言论的一种收紧。” 自媒体要为党所用 陈薇羽说，第二类要被监管的对象是水军账号。水军其实就是所谓的“五毛账号”，他们其实都是中国官方豢养来帮忙传播信息的，现在中共却回过头来要打击整治他们，这说明了水军这种网络信息传播的载体，不仅仅是为中共当局服务，其实也被广泛应用在娱乐界、商业领域，甚至是中共高层的政治博弈里面。 她说：“所以，中共他对这种水军账号的打击呢，他并不是想要消灭这种水军的存在，我认为他是想要消灭不能为他所用的水军，尤其就是那些跟习近平当局唱反调的这种水军账号吧。” 陈薇羽说，第三类要整治的就是民间的自媒体，这里面有一部分是批量生产、摆拍造假、赚取流量的，另一部分则是一般民众发的维权上访、暴力执法等爆料信息，后者的账号很容易被关闭，发布信息的人也很容易被抓，但实际上中共很难禁止这一类的自媒体，因为当一个人没有渠道去说话、为自己申诉不公时，最后只能自己发视频为自己发声，中共想挡也挡不住，自媒体已经成为现代人反抗暴政的最好工具。 分析人士说，中共除了想透过控制自媒体来传递政策，达到对人民洗脑的目的外，更重要的是封锁言论，避免自媒体传播一些聚会抗议的信息，造成星火燎原，变成中共统治的危机。 陈薇羽认为，中共最需要整治造假的对象其实是它自己，因为她现在回过头去看她小时候读的教科书，比如雷锋、董存瑞炸碉堡、黄继光去堵枪眼，或者黄世仁、南霸天是恶霸地主等，这些其实都是中共捏造出来、给中国人洗脑用的，更不用提抗战的历史完全颠倒黑白，将当年国民政府主席蒋介石带领国民党抗日的一些成果都移花接木到共产党头上。由此可见，只有为中共涂脂抹粉的历史，才是他们认为的正确史观，自媒体自然也是如此，只有帮忙传播中共想听的言论，才有存在意义。 陈薇羽比喻，这就好比上游的水一直在放毒，下游当然没有干净的水可喝，如果不从源头解决问题，光靠堵上别人的嘴，又有什么用呢，毒水还是在那里啊！ 评论区

普京称已签署关于批准新版俄外交政策构想的命令2023年3月31日, 19:36 © Sputnik / Alexey Nikolsky / 跳轉媒體庫 俄罗斯卫星通讯社莫斯科3月31日电 俄罗斯总统普京表示，他31日签署了关于批准新版《俄罗斯联邦外交政策构想》的命令。 普京在与俄联邦安全会议常委开会时说：“今天我签署了关于批准新版俄联邦外交政策构想的命令。” 普京 俄罗斯卫星通讯社 中国 俄罗斯 国际 俄中关系 评论 多媒体 播客 经济 军事 科技 体育 娱乐 WeChatWeibo 关于我们 资料使用条款 反馈 © 2023 Sputnik(卫星社) 所有权利均受保护 京ICP备2020045094号-1 18+ 新闻时间线 0

鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 普京不用手机 何频不用微信

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 普京不用手机 何频不用微信

鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 美国禁华为有理

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 美国禁华为有理

鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 反客为主 天下奇闻 不知羞耻 华为手机天下第一

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 反客为主 天下奇闻 不知羞耻 华为手机天下第一

国会共和党人针对是否全面封禁TikTok激烈交锋李逸华 2023年3月31日 03:06 美国国会共和党参议员乔什·霍利（Sen. Josh Hawley）和来自本党的参议员兰德·保罗（Sen. Rand Paul）星期三（3月29日）就是否该全面禁止中国社交媒体应用程序TikTok陷入激烈争辩。这凸显出国会在有关问题上仍呈现分歧。尽管大多数两党议员都认同TikTok所构成的安全威胁，但在如何处置的问题上还未取得一致共识，少数分属左翼进步派和右翼保守派的两党议员已公开表示反对全面封禁。 来自密苏里州的霍利长期以来主张TikTok是美国国家安全的威胁，并多次呼吁美国应禁用TikTok。 今年1月，霍利提出《美国设备禁用TikTok法》（No TikTok on United States Devices Act），目标在于全面禁止TiKTok在美国运营，并禁止与TiKTok的中国母公司字节跳动的商业活动。 国会参众两院在去年通过了霍利提出的《政府设备禁用TikTok法》（No TikTok on Government Devices Act），并由总统拜登签署生效。法案在今年3月正式生效。 星期三，霍利在参议院发言，要求全院针对TikTok进一步采取行动，无异议通过他的《美国设备禁用TikTok法》。 “TikTok的问题不是应用程序上的影片。TikTok的问题是他是中国共产党的后门，进入个人生活和资讯，进入每一个美国人最私密的细节，”霍利说。 他接着指出许多国会议员们担心的问题，也就是TikTok及其母公司字节跳动和中国共产党之间的关联。 来自密苏里州的霍利参议员说，“我们知道TikTok和中国共产党之间的连接是真实的。我们知道TikTok是其中国母公司字节跳动的全资子公司。我们知道字节跳动有中国共产党员在他们的领导层。事实上，字节跳动的总编辑是个党委书记。我们知道共产党对TikTok和字节跳动员工进行了训练。我们有视频，他们在北京这么做。” TikTok首席执行官周受资（Shou Zi Chew）上周四（3月23日）在美国国会众议院接受民主共和两党议员将近五个小时的连环“拷问”。 周受资在数据安全和内容管理上做出了一系列解释和承诺，但在回答中国政府影响的具体问题时常常闪躲。而议员们总体上并不满意周受资的回答。 “当他上个星期被问到有关问题时，TikTok首席执行官没有否认这种间谍行为，”霍利说。 不过，霍利要求院会无异议通过全面禁止TikTok议案的提议立刻遭到同党籍的保罗参议员反对。 “有两个主要的理由我们不应该这么做，”来自肯塔基州的共和党人保罗说，“一个是宪法第一修正案。言论是受到保护的，无论你喜不喜欢。第二个原因是宪法实际上禁止褫夺公民权法案。你不能针对一个个人或一个公司制定特定的法案。因此，这法案违反了这两个重点，相当明显的重点。” “褫夺公民权法案”（bills of attainder）主要内容指的是允许政府在没有经过审判程序的情况下，惩罚被认为是犯罪的一方，刑罚大多为褫夺公民权利和没收财产。在美国，褫夺公民权法案是违反宪法的。 保罗参议员还指控不断以国家安全为由来主张禁止TikTok的做法是在“鼓吹恐惧”。他还进一步指出，美国大型科技公司都和TikTok一样在收集大量的美国用户数据。 保罗说，“我认为我们应该对那些鼓动恐惧的人有所提防。我认为我们应该对那些利用恐惧来哄骗美国人放弃我们的自由、来规范和限制我们第一修正案的人有所警惕。每一项有关TikTok收集数据的指控其实都可以适用在美国国内大型科技公司。” 霍利也随即作出反击。他首先询问保罗议员是否愿意回答他一个问题。保罗议员拒绝之后，霍利再次发言，反驳保罗所引述的第一修正案保护言论自由的观点适用在TikTok的情况上。 “我从来没有在这个院会听过保护间谍的权利，”霍利说。 “我没有意识到第一修正案包括从事间谍活动的权利，来自肯塔基州的参议员提到权利法案，我一定是漏掉了我们权利法案里中国政府监视美国人的权利，”霍利以讽刺的语气说道，“因为那正是我们现在讨论的事情。” 来自佛罗里达州的共和党参议员马可·鲁比奥（Sen. Marco Rubio）随即加入论战。 作为参议院情报委员会副主席的鲁比奥在国会中也不断大力推动立法，希望禁止TikTok在美国运作。 他一进入院会就直接反驳了保罗参议员根据第一修正案所提出的理由。 “这不是第一修正案的问题，因为我们不是在禁止那些扭来扭去的跳舞视频。我不知道有没有更好的说法，但那不是我们要禁止的东西，这不是关于网络上的视频内容，这是关于这家公司的运作方式对国家安全构成的危险，”鲁比奥说。 鲁比奥接着表示，TikTok的核心问题在于它是一家受到中国共产党影响甚至控制的公司，因为在中国所有的私营企业都必须配合政府的要求行事。 “我不在乎谁拥有字节跳动，不在乎它是不是100%由美国人拥有，字节跳动在中国境外运营，但我们需要知道的是，在中国没有私人企业，他们是不存在的，”鲁比奥说，“根据中国法律，他们的国家安全法和国家情报法，中国的每一家企业必须做任何共产党要他们做的事。共产党可以告诉字节跳动，我们想要你用这样的算法来向美国人推送这样的视频，说服他们某件事，他们必须照做，他们没有选择。” “他们可能不想照做，但问问马云他发生了什么，”鲁比奥说。 除了在院会与本党同仁辩护，保罗参议员星期三还在肯塔基州路易斯维尔的《信使日报》(Courier-Journal)发文表示：“国会共和党人提出了一项永久输掉一代人选举的国家战略：禁止使用名为TikTok的社交媒体应用程序，该应用程序有9400万用户，其中主要是美国年轻人。” 这位保守派的共和党参议员写道：“在禁止TikTok之前，这些审查人员可能会发现中国政府已经禁止了TikTok。嗯......我们真的要效仿中国的禁言吗？” TikTok是中国短视频分享平台抖音的海外版，虽然TikTok和抖音同属字节跳动并享有同样标识，但是中国境内居民一直以来只能使用境内版的抖音，自TikTok于2016年诞生之初，他们就无法下载该程序。 与此同时，一些民主党进步派议员也开始公开发声，对全面禁令表示质疑。 上星期五，来自纽约州的民主党众议员亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯(Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez)在一段TikTok视频中反对TikTok禁令，称其“前所未有”，并表示国会尚未收到有关TikTok的机密简报。她说：“这对我来说感觉不对。” 来自明尼苏达州的民主党众议员伊尔汗·奥马尔(Rep.Ilhan Omar)星期二发表声明，她承认担忧社交媒体平台上的隐私和私人用户数据被收集是合理的，但认为TikTok禁令不能解决这些问题。 她还指出：“美国模式依赖于我们对这些自由的保护——公开发言反对政府的能力，或者如果你愿意的话，分享一段10秒钟的烹饪你最喜欢的食物的视频。这就是我们民主和宪法的美妙之处。这就是我们与像中国这样的威权政权不同的地方。这就是我们应该为世界树立的榜样。” 不过，目前国会两党议员反对TikTok的声音仍然更为强烈。 除了霍利参议员的法案禁止TikTok在美国运营外，国会目前还有多项内容类似但细节有些微不同的法案，目标都是在限制TikTok在美国的运作。 鲁比奥参议员和共和党众议员麦克·加拉格尔（Rep. Mike Gallagher）以及民主党众议员拉贾·克里什纳莫迪（Rep. Raja Krisnamoorthi）今年联袂提出《反中共社交媒体法》（Averting the National Threat of Internet Surveillance, Oppressive Censorship, and Influence, and Algorithmic Learning by the Chinese Communist Party Act，简称ANTI-SOCIAL CCP Act），将禁止来自中国、俄罗斯及其他令人关切的国家的社交媒体公司进行所有业务交易。这项法案去年12月在上届国会曾由同一组议员提出。 在这项议题上，国会中获得两党呼声最大的法案则是由参议院情报委员会主席、来自弗吉尼亚州的马克·沃纳参议员（Sen. Mark Warner）和共和党党鞭、来自南达科他州的联邦参议员约翰·图恩(Sen. John Thune)本月共同提出的《限制法》(RESTRICT ACT) 。这项议案赋予美国商务部施加限制的权力，包括全面禁止TikTok和其他构成国家安全风险的技术。 白宫已表示支持推进这项立法。不过，这些法案未来是否将取得进展仍不得而知。任何法案必须先通过管辖权所属的委员会后，才能送到全体院会等候表决。法案在分别获得参众两院的院会表决通过并统一文本后，还要送交白宫，由总统签署，才能生效成为法律。 相关内容TikTok面临全美封禁之际，两党少数议员发声反对禁令 2023年3月29日 21:38 美国国安机构负责人警告： TikTok 是中国派遣的“特洛伊木马” 2023年3月29日 06:23 TikTok忙撇清之际，中国官方借机批美并宣传自己对外企的包容 2023年3月29日 02:45 CEO周受资的作证加深国会忧虑 议长麦卡锡称将推进 TikTok 禁令 2023年3月27日 06:05 在美国国会听证会上频频吃瘪的TikTok首席执行官周受资在中国成了“英雄” 2023年3月25日 16:49 交锋国会山：美议员严厉“拷问”TikTok首席执行官 2023年3月24日 01:58 这是美国之音的多媒体播放器。 当您选择一个伴随音频或视频的故事时，它在这里播放。 您可以随时查看原始故事或查找新故事，而无需通过在此页面上向下滑动来停止音频或视频。 通过从屏幕底部的圆形蓝色多媒体按钮向上滑动来再次打开此屏幕。 通过点击多媒体按钮启动和停止音频或视频。 安全访问已启动 设置

鸿儒馆 十七年 二十八年

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 鸿儒馆 十七年 二十八年

鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 鸿儒馆谨此申请 好莱坞有史以来 最佳导演奖

鸿儒私塾观察 鸿儒私塾实境馆 鸿儒馆Pinterest 鸿儒馆谨此申请 好莱坞有史以来 最佳导演奖

中法完成首单液化天然气人民币结算交易发表时间： 30/03/2023 - 22:35 le 29 mars 2023, Pékin et Brasilia ont scellé un accord pour ne régler leurs échanges internationaux que dans leurs propres monnaies, yuans et réais © LEE JAE-WON 作者：法广 4 分钟 亚洲 – 中国海油（中国海洋石油集团有限公司）与法国道达尔能源（TotalEnergies）刚刚完成首单以人民币结算的液化天然气采购交易，成交量为6.5万吨。 广告 继续浏览后续 液化天然气将从阿拉伯联合酋长国（UAE）运输到中国。这是中国寻求减少对美元的依赖，扩大人民币作为世界储备货币使用范围的新举措。 法国《论坛报》30日报道，在 12 月访问沙特阿拉伯利雅得期间，中国国家主席习近平曾呼吁海湾国家通过该平台以人民币向中国出售碳氢化合物。 更广泛地说，北京决心挑战美元在国际贸易中的霸权地位，并强制使用自己的货币，至少在自己的进出口业务中是如此。 此前，中国已开始以人民币进行石油交易，而这是首单以人民币支付的液化天然气供应交易。据专家称，这可能是改变目前以美元为主导的全球金融体系的第一步。同时，许多国家已经开始减少在经济交易中对美元的依赖。这种趋势未来可能会持续。 据新华社报道，中国海油与法国道达尔能源28日完成首单液化天然气跨境人民币结算交易，这也是我国首单以人民币结算的进口液化天然气（LNG）采购，标志着中国在油气贸易领域的跨境人民币结算交易探索迈出实质性一步。 29日，巴西外交部引述巴西贸易和投资促进局的一份声明宣布，巴西已与中国达成一项协议，可以用本币而非美元进行双边贸易交易。中国外交部30日对此回应称，中国和巴西今年年初签署了在巴西建立人民币清算安排的合作备忘录，这有利于中国与巴西两国企业和金融机构使用人民币进行跨境交易，促进双边的贸易投资便利化。 继续阅读相同主题内容: 能源 同一主题 RFI原材/俄乌战争 俄乌战争:俄罗斯石油收入大减 政治 中东宿敌伊朗与沙特阿拉伯在北京斡旋下将恢复外交关系 更多时事视频 其他新闻 首单人民币结算交易 30/03/2023 中法完成首单液化天然气人民币结算交易 中国/俄罗斯 30/03/2023 【视频】1950-1982：中苏关系动荡的30年回顾 台湾/美国/中国 30/03/2023 【视频】如蔡英文会晤麦肯锡 北京承诺“报复” 中国/美国/台湾 30/03/2023 皮尤称台海紧张民意忧虑多增 美《外交》杂志提醒习近平正在准备战争世界要当真！ 中国/俄罗斯/乌克兰战争 30/03/2023 中国军方称与俄罗斯军方多方合作 30/03/2023 中国称在新冠数据上没有任何隐瞒 中国/海外部署反腐执法 30/03/2023 美媒称中国要在海外部署反腐执法人员 洪都拉斯/台湾/中国 30/03/2023 洪都拉斯总统卡斯特罗称断绝与台湾关系后将访华 中国/乌克兰/习近平/泽连斯基 30/03/2023 华日：泽连斯基敦促习近平访问乌克兰 考验中国中立 巴西/政治 30/03/2023 博索纳罗不顾风险重返故土以发挥政治影响力 中国/博鳌/李强 30/03/2023 中国博鳌开幕 李强亮相喊乐观经济 中国，经济，房地产业 30/03/2023 中国最大房地产开发商碧桂园公布其十五年来首次年度亏损 台湾/美国/中国 30/03/2023 台湾总统蔡英文出访过境美国纽约 美媒称面临中国反制威胁 我的「节目播放目录」 您的Playlist尚无内容 头条 繁 收听 时事 网上电台

因经济困难，中国年轻人“似乎迷失了方向”发表时间： 31/03/2023 - 00:01 分享 法国世界报上海通讯员勒普拉特（Simon Leplâtre）在该报刊出的报道文章表示，在中国，三年严苛的清零政策已经结束，但现在中国各行各业都在忙着裁员和减薪。最受影响的是年轻人。中国年轻人因经济困难而“似乎迷失了方向”并寻求“稳定”。 法国世界报 RFI 勒普拉特写道，自2022年12月初清零政策结束以来，中国经济在逐渐恢复活力。看着周末的上海的商业街，你会以为一切都恢复了正常。但是当你和企业交谈时，很快你就知道：经济的恢复是很有限的：人们在拿出钱包的时候，是很谨慎的。 年轻人处于失业第一线 23岁的上海美容师谢瓯然（Xie Ouran）告诉世界报记者说，“以前，我经常点外卖。但现在，为了省钱，我一般都自己做饭。”这位年轻的美容师是2018年来到上海的，她说那时候她每个月的收入在7000到1万元之间。现在，因为没有客户，每个月只能拿到4000元。 马克斯·普朗克研究所（Max Planck Institute）的社会人类学研究员向飚（音）分析说，“经过几年的新冠，年轻人似乎迷失了方向。”他说，“年轻人有两种应对的方式：一是放弃，不再做任何计划了；二是非常谨慎地计划自己的生活，避免冒任何风险，大家都挤着去参加公务员考试，就是例证。” 在上海读计算机工程专业的22岁学生于波（Yubo）说，“疫情影响了很多行业，我的同学们寻求的主要是稳定，创业不再是梦想了。” 法国世界报上海通讯员还写道，房地产的销售2022年下降了24%。自2022年夏季以来，出口一直在下滑。在这些背景下，公司在重组、在裁员、在降低工资。受冲击最大的，是刚刚进入劳动力市场的年轻人，1月份16到24岁年龄段的失业率达到了17.3%。 学着更节俭地生活 没有受到影响的领域非常少。根据旅游部，2019年至2021年期间，旅行社的员工人数减少了一半。据“晨智大数据”的数字，2020年至2022年间，中国餐馆中大约有10%倒闭了。科技公司也在大幅裁员。2022年前9个月，百度、阿里巴巴和腾讯至少裁减了2万4千人。 网络平台尤其受到影响。29岁的朱女士以前在好未来教育集团当经理，她每月的收入是1万8千元。 但是，2021年8月，随着中国政府对教培行业的整改，好未来裁掉了9万个职位，朱女士就是其中之一。后来，朱女士在她的家乡西安的一所私立学校找到了一份教师的工作，现在她每月的收入是5500元。 这一切都对消费产生了明显的影响。朱女士说：“我很生气，天天看到广告和促销，可我必须一分钱一分钱地节省。” 香港恒生银行首席经济学家王丹表示：“1月底的农历新年期间，有过一些快乐购物，但这已经结束了。根据我们的计算，零售额仅仅只是2019年的60%。” 在网上，很明显可以感觉到年轻人的沮丧。许多论坛都在探讨怎么样才能更省钱。有的说，要“低欲望”。另外一些还想享乐的人则说，要“精致穷”。 帮助品牌了解中国市场并进行推广的鹿数字通信（音，Lu Digital Communication）的联合创始人孔女士（Sizhang Kong）说，“现在的年轻人挣的钱比父母少，十年前不是这样的，所以，现在不是可以肆无忌惮消费的时代了。” 对房地产失去信心 对于中国年轻人来说，房地产的下跌加大了不确定性。人们对他们将70%的积蓄都投进去的这个领域失去了信心。29岁的姚益田（化名）是一家太阳能电池板公司的销售人员，2021年中，她和弟弟以150万元的价格在西安购买了一套在建的公寓。但是，当楼盘的结构完成时，开发商的资金链断了。一夜之间，一切都停下来了。这位年轻女子说，“我们对政府失去了信心……，我们付了一百多万，却什么都没有得到，我们到各机构去求助，可我们被踩得像擦鞋垫一样！” 30岁的潘女士（Zoé Pan）从事市场营销工作，她已 因经济困难，中国年轻人“似乎迷失了方向” 30/03/2023 蔡英文去美国过境，马英九在中国大陆访问 29/03/2023 “习近平想依靠南方世界并避开北方世界，来成为不容置疑的强国” 28/03/2023 刚过去的欧盟峰会上，中国主题几乎无所不在 25/03/2023 TikTok想玩弄舆论来对抗西方政府

金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？Can the U.S. See the Truth About China?DAVID MARCHESE2023年3月29日 PHOTO ILLUSTRATION BY BRÁULIO AMADOJust like relationships between people, relationships between countries can all too easily be built on a foundation of unintentional misunderstandings, faulty assumptions and predigested truths. In her forthcoming, at times provocative and disquieting book, “The New China Playbook,” Keyu Jin, a professor at the London School of Economics and a board member at Credit Suisse, is trying to rework the foundation of what she sees as the West’s deeply flawed understanding of China’s economy, its economic ambitions and its attitude toward global competition. And through that work, Jin wants to help improve the frosty relationship between the country and its presumed geo-political opponents. “We’re in an incredibly dangerous world right now,” says Jin, who was born in Beijing and earned her Ph.D. in economics from Harvard and whose father, Jin Liqun, served as a vice minister of finance for China. “Without more effort made to understand each other’s perspectives, peaceful coexistence may not be possible.” (Jin joined the Credit Suisse board in 2022, not long after the bank was shaken by a series of scandals and losses. After this interview was conducted, the bank was sold to UBS, another Swiss bank. Through a spokes-person, Jin declined to comment on Credit Suisse’s situation.) 就像人与人之间的关系那样，国家之间的关系也很容易建立在无意的误解、错误的假设，以及过于简化的事实基础上。伦敦政治经济学院教授、瑞士信贷董事会成员金刻羽即将出版新书《新的中国战略手册》(The New China Playbook)，在这本有时具有煽动性、有时令人不安的书中，她试图重建西方与中国关系的基础，她认为西方对中国经济、中国的经济野心，以及中国如何看待全球竞争的理解存在严重缺陷。金刻羽希望通过这种重建来帮助改善中国与其假定的地缘政治对手之间的冷淡关系。金刻羽在北京出生，在哈佛大学获得了经济学博士学位，她的父亲金立群曾任中国财政部副部长。“我们正处在一个极其危险的世界中，”她说。“如果不做出更大努力来了解彼此的观点，和平共处恐怕是不可能的。”（金刻羽2022年加入瑞士信贷董事会，之后不久，这家银行因一系列丑闻和亏损濒临崩溃。瑞士信贷已在这次采访之后被另一家瑞士银行瑞银收购。金刻羽通过一名发言人拒绝对瑞士信贷的情况置评。） What do U.S. policymakers just not get about China’s economy and the Communist Party leadership’s thinking about competition with America? China’s current economic challenge is to overcome its middle-income trap, something that the United States might not relate to. It’s not all about displacing the United States as global hegemon, which would come with a huge amount of burdens and responsibilities. And I don’t think China is ready or willing to do that. To see China solely as trying to displace the United States is only going to stoke more fears. The United States can come up with better policies regarding real national-security concerns, but the government is doing things that to us are so un-American, like reducing the number of visas issued or curbing investment in China and Chinese investment in America. That doesn’t seem to be the spirit of collaboration. But understanding where China is coming from would be a step forward. 关于中国经济以及中共领导人如何看待中美竞争，美国的决策者究竟存在怎样的误解？中国当前的经济挑战是克服中等收入陷阱，这也许是美国不了解的东西。这不都是关于要取代美国成为全球霸主，那会给中国带来巨大的负担和责任。我不认为中国已经做好准备或愿意承担那些责任。将中国仅仅视为试图取代美国的国家只会引发更多的恐惧。虽然美国可以就真正的国家安全担忧拿出更好的政策，但在我们看来，美国政府正在做的事情太不符合美国价值了，比如减少发放签证数量，或限制美国对中国以及中国对美国的投资。这似乎不是合作精神。但了解中国的出发点将是一个进步。 Do you see large-scale Chinese industrial espionage as inhibiting that understanding? There are thorny issues between the two countries, and the more they trade, the more issues there are. But we want to see China as dynamic. It has changed a great deal. China liked to take the shortcuts in the beginning. It wanted to become an innovator, and it wanted to become great. But there was not a complete legal framework or rules and laws in place. China changed so it could join the World Trade Organization. Interestingly enough, these so-called technology transfers, or the misappropriation you mentioned — lots of industry studies show that they don’t work as effectively as they were supposed to. Instead, for example, in the electric-vehicle sector, where everybody started from the same place, China was able to leapfrog. Lots of companies say that even at the risk of technological misappropriation, China is too lucrative a market to pass over. They would rather take the risk. 你认为中国的大规模工业间谍活动是这种了解的障碍吗？中美两国之间有很多棘手的问题，而且贸易越多，问题也越多。但我们想动态地看中国。中国已发生了很大的变化。中国开始时喜欢走捷径，想成为一个创新者，想变得伟大。但没有一个完整的法律框架或可用的规则和法律。中国为加入世界贸易组织有所改变。有趣的是，许多行业研究表明，这些所谓的技术转让，或者你所说的盗用，并不像预期的那样有效。反而是在大家都从同一个地方起步的领域，例如电动汽车，中国能跨越式发展。许多公司说，即使存在技术盗用的风险，中国市场的利润也丰厚到不可错过的程度。他们宁愿冒那个险。 金刻羽2018年在慕尼黑的一场会议上。 GANDALF HAMMERBACHER/PICTURE-ALLIANCEIt seems pretty apparent that President Xi Jinping is moving away from the United States and the European Union and toward other countries with politically similar systems, like Russia or Iran. But those countries are unlikely to be economic partners for China on the level of the U.S. or the E.U. What are the implications of that shift for China’s longer-term economic growth? China has a slightly different world vision from the U.S. and maybe from Europe, which is coexistence of different political systems, different economic systems, a multipolar world — I think that’s one of China’s global agendas. Of course, intereconomically, there is much more trade. China still upholds this view of globalization, but geopolitics is making this increasingly difficult. So I would argue that at the same time it seeks this multipolar balance, it is slightly pushed to become closer to some of these countries that you mentioned. 很明显，习近平主席正在远离美国和欧盟，转向其他政治体制相似的国家，比如俄罗斯或者伊朗。但这些国家不太可能成为中国在美国或欧盟那种层面上的经济伙伴。这种转变对中国的长期经济增长有什么影响？中国的世界观与美欧略有不同，即不同的政治制度、不同的经济制度共存，以及世界的多极化——我认为这是中国的全球议程之一。当然，从经济上讲，要有更多的贸易。中国仍然坚持这种全球化观点，但地缘政治使之变得越来越困难。所以我认为，在寻求这种多极平衡的同时，它也稍微受到了推动，与你提到的这些国家当中的一些走得更近。 But what’s pushing China toward more closely aligning with Russia if not political affinity? To be very frank, it’s hard to say, “Let’s hold hands with Europe and the United States,” after the increasing tension, the export controls, the view that somehow the United States wants to limit China’s development and advancement in technology innovation. People believe that there was demonization of China early in the pandemic; there was aggressive rhetoric during Donald Trump’s presidency. It’s more difficult after that happens to say, “OK, let’s work on things like Russia and Ukraine.” Russia — and I’m not an expert on these issues — presents some security concerns for China. The Chinese people believe that a substantially weakened Russia might not be in the interest of China, because if there were the sense that the United States needed to seek out an opponent, China would be next. Not an easy answer there. 但是，如果不是政治上的认同，是什么在推动中国与俄罗斯更紧密地结盟呢？非常坦率地说，经过了紧张局势加剧、出口管制、认为美国在某种程度上想限制中国在技术创新方面的发展和进步之后，中国很难说出“让我们与欧洲和美国携手吧”。人们认为，大流行早期出现了对中国的妖魔化；唐纳德·特朗普在担任总统期间发表了侵略性言论。发生这种情况后，再说“好吧，让我们一起处理俄罗斯和乌克兰这样的问题”就更困难了。俄罗斯问题——我不是这些方面的专家——给中国带来了一些安全考量。中国人认为，一个大幅削弱的俄罗斯可能不符合中国的利益，因为如果人们觉得美国需要寻找一个对手，那么中国将是下一个。这不是一个三言两语就能说清楚的问题。 But to be honest, one of the things that I found most interesting — or perplexing — about your book was what felt like an elision of moral questions about how China operates. For example, you say there’s room for a vibrant debate on Chinese social media. But China is consistently ranked near the bottom when it comes to media freedom. Or you write that the Chinese people are generally willing to trade security for freedom. Were the Uyghurs willing to make that trade? The book also doesn’t mention the human rights questions raised by the hukou system and the way it treats rural residents. I’m trying to understand your perspective on these issues, because to me they seem connected to economics. I appreciate these questions. One reason it’s probably not thoroughly addressed is because my book is about economics and political economy. I wanted to touch upon points where there were surveys and data. These other subjects require more expertise and more thorough research, which I haven’t done. For sure, there’s much more control over media than in the past. I was pointing out in the book, though, that social media is used for two-way monitoring. There was a lot of criticism about government; there were protests last year over land seizures. These were not hidden. But the Chinese government does exhibit a great deal of paternalism. Officials think that a public narrative that is uncontrolled can lead to instability or more divisiveness. I’m not saying that the people prefer it that way, but when they’re asked about a trade-off between security and freedom, surveys show a vast difference from, say, the average U.S. citizen. Then you touched upon the huge issues of the migrant workers, the minorities in China. There are hundreds of millions people who could be in a better position, but things are changing. These are enduring challenges. On the one hand, yes, there’s more control, less liberty. On the other hand, there is an improving situation for people with more dire situations. 但是说实话，我发现你的书中最有趣——或者说最令人困惑——的其中一点是，感觉你回避了对中国如何运作的道德问题。例如，你说在中国的社交媒体上有一个充满活力的辩论空间。但在媒体自由方面，中国的排名一直接近垫底。或者你写道，中国人民通常愿意用安全换取自由。维吾尔人愿意做这种交易吗？书中也没有提到户口制度，以及它对待农村人口的方式所引起的人权问题。我想了解你对这些问题的看法，因为对我来说，它们似乎与经济有关。谢谢你的问题。这个问题可能没有彻底讨论的一个原因是，我的书是关于经济和政治经济学的。我想讨论有调查和数据的东西。其他这些课题需要更多的专业知识和更彻底的研究，而我还没有做这些工作。可以肯定的是，现在对媒体的控制比过去多得多。不过，我在书中指出，社交媒体被用于双向监督。有很多对政府的批评；去年发生了与征地相关的抗议活动。这些都没有被隐藏。但中国政府确实表现出了大量的家长式作风。官员们认为，不受控制的公共叙事会导致不稳定或更多的分裂。我并不是说人民喜欢这种方式，但当他们被问及安全和自由之间的权衡时，调查显示，结果与普通美国公民有很大的不同。然后你提到中国的农民工和少数民族这个大问题。数以亿计的人处境本可以更好，但情况正在发生变化。这些是持久的挑战。一方面，是的，有更多的控制，更少的自由。另一方面，对于处境更糟糕的人来说，情况也在改善。 The treatment of the Uyghurs doesn’t quite fit the framework of an improving situation. David, I understand. This particular subject is something where I have so little information and I don’t know what’s going on and there’s so many different accounts. I prefer not to comment on this and be irresponsible. But it is open for visits now. I think people should go take a look, then make a judgment on their own. It’s a complex situation. There are improvements, there are deteriorations, and we have to recognize that. 维吾尔人的待遇并不完全符合改善状况的框架。戴维，我理解。对于这个特定的主题，我所掌握的信息太少，我不知道发生了什么，而且有这么多不同的说法。我宁愿不对此发表不负责任的评论。但现在那里已经对外人开放了。我认为人们应该去看一看，然后自己做出判断。这是一个复杂的情况。有改善，也有恶化，我们必须承认这一点。 Do you feel inhibited in your ability to be critical of China? I’m an economist at the end of the day, and the way I’m trained, we like to say, “OK, where is the evidence?” That’s how I like to focus my analysis. Where there are policy mistakes, I’d be more than happy to share my views. There are more courageous people and more experts who can do that. What I’m trying to accomplish is using a different lens to focus on economic issues. 你是否感觉自己批评中国的能力受到了压制？归根结底，我是经济学家，根据我接受的训练，我们喜欢说，“好吧，证据在哪里？”这就是我分析的重点所在。在政策出现错误的地方，我非常乐意分享我的观点。有更多勇敢的人和更多专家可以做到这一点。我想要实现的是用不同的视角来关注经济问题。 You mentioned the trade-offs that people are willing to make within different political systems, which you also write about in the book: “Despite the limits China imposes on free-market forces, the absence of a free press, independent judicial system and the individual right to vote, we see there are other mechanisms in place to respond to the needs of its citizens and to address the threats posed by inequality.” That “despite” is doing a lot of work. It reminds me of that line, “Other than that, how was the play, Mrs. Lincoln?” I was trying to say that those are all things that we believe to be essential for sustained economic growth. I was saying that despite all that, China still performed well. I wasn’t necessarily suggesting that the things you mentioned weren’t important. I was more framing it as the puzzle of China’s economic growth. I was trying to say that those are all things that we believe to be essential for sustained economic growth. I was saying that despite all that, China still performed well. But I will say that the model that worked for China when it was building factories is not going to be the system that would work for innovation, where you need people to be able to get rich, where you need solid intellectual-property protection, where you have to have clear and transparent policies and rule of law. That worked in the last era. Doesn’t necessarily work in the new era. 你提到人们在不同的政治制度下愿意做出的权衡，你在书中还写道：“尽管中国对自由市场力量施加了限制，缺乏新闻自由、独立的司法系统和个人投票权，但我们看到还有其他机制可以回应公民的需求，并应对不平等带来的威胁。”这个“尽管”非常重要。这让我想起了那句台词，“除此之外，林肯夫人，这出戏怎么样？”（意为忽略重点——译注）我想说的是，这些都是我们认为对经济保持持续增长至关重要的事情。我是说尽管如此，中国仍然表现良好。我并不是说你提到的事情不重要。我倾向于将其描述为中国经济增长之谜。但我要说的是，在中国建立工厂时起作用的模式不会适用于创新体系，在创新中，你需要人们能够致富，你需要坚实的知识产权保护，在这方面你必须有清晰透明的政策和法治。这在上个时代行得通。不一定适用于新时代。 Let’s turn the lens of your book around: What are the biggest blind spots the Chinese leadership has when it comes to understanding American policies toward the country? I think the Chinese leaders have this notion that the United States is doing everything it can to try to stop China from growing. Or they believe that whatever China does is not going to elicit more trust. So I think this blind spot is that the leadership is convinced that there’s no way out of this. I’m not sure that is the case. And then also, the United States thinks that China wants to displace it. 让我们换一个角度看你的书：在理解美国对华政策方面，中国领导人的最大盲点是什么？我认为中国领导人有这样一种观念，即美国正在竭尽全力阻止中国的发展。或者他们认为，无论中国做什么，都不会赢得更多信任。所以我认为这个盲点是，领导层确信这方面没有解决办法。我不觉得是这样。此外还有，美国认为中国想要取代它。 Doesn’t it? No. China thinks that its economy should be the largest in the world, not because it’s rich but because it’s large: 1.4 billion people! But that’s very different from overtaking the United States in terms of innovative power and military power and real economic power. I don’t think anybody believes that is a realistic goal for China. Again, we have very different understandings of how we see each other. 不是吗？不是的。中国认为它的经济应该是世界上最大的，不是因为它富有，而是因为它很大：14亿人！但这与在创新能力、军事实力和实际经济实力方面超越美国截然不同。我觉得没有人会认为这对中国来说是一个现实的目标。同样，我们对如何看待彼此有非常不同的理解。 金刻羽（右二）2020年在瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛。GREG BEADLE/WORLD ECONOMIC FORUMWhat specific things, besides stopping industrial espionage, could China do to increase trust? Giving American companies, financial institutions, more opportunities to make money, opening up its various sectors more aggressively — that will allow more dialogue, more cooperation. That’s one thing. Second, it’s understandable for the United States to push back on some of the industrial espionage. But China’s best technologies, the ones that are really successful right now, artificial intelligence or batteries or its payment system — all of that is based on domestic competition. The industrial espionage stems from a lack of appreciation from the start of intellectual property, and the United States, by pushing China to do more intellectual-property protection, is actually good for China. I think it’s on a substantial downward trend, this misappropriation of technologies, because it’s actually not good for China’s own goals. 除了制止工业间谍活动，中国还可以采取哪些具体措施来增强信任？给美国公司、金融机构更多赚钱的机会，更积极地开放各个领域——这将使得出现更多的对话、更多的合作。这是一方面。其次，美国抵制一些工业间谍活动是可以理解的。但中国最好的技术，目前真正成功的技术，人工智能或电池或其支付系统——所有这些都基于国内竞争。工业间谍源于一开始对知识产权缺乏重视，而美国通过推动中国加强知识产权保护，实际上对中国有利。我认为这种盗用技术的情况呈大幅下降趋势，因为这实际上不利于中国自己的目标。 The next question is more of an epistemological one. The animating idea of your book is that people see the same situation from different perspectives. So when you hear my skepticism about things like Chinese labor policy or media freedom being treated benignly, do you hear it as my being stuck in a particular ideological paradigm? Or maybe that my thinking is itself an example of the misunderstandings that the book is trying to address? I totally understand, because the first time I came to the United States in 1997, my classmates were asking me about human rights in Tibet. In China, meanwhile, we were busy building and developing and reforming. The focal points have been different. That’s not to say that the economic means justify the unfortunate circumstances. But China is a country that has done the most economically for the most number of people in the shortest amount of time. If you look at the new generation, they are open-minded on a whole range of issues, so much more than their parents. They care about animal rights, worker rights, social inequity. That shift gives us hope that China will progress. 下一个问题更像是一个认识论问题。在你的书里，人们从不同的角度看待相同的情况，这是一个生动的立意。那么，当你听到我对中国的劳工政策或媒体自由受到尊重等问题持怀疑态度时，你是否认为我陷入了一种特定的意识形态范式？或者说，我的想法也许本身就是一个示例，是这本书试图消除的误解之一？我完全理解，因为1997年我第一次来美国时，同学们问我西藏的人权问题。与此同时，在中国，我们忙于建设、发展和改革。关注点不同。这并不是说经济手段可以证明不幸的事情是合理的。但是中国是一个在经济方面用最短的时间为最多人做出努力的国家。如果你看看新一代，他们在一系列问题上都持开放态度，比他们的父辈要开放得多。他们关心动物权利、工人权利和社会不平等。这种转变让我们对中国的进步充满希望。 图片来源：金刻羽 这篇采访对两次对话进行了编辑和浓缩。 David Marchese是《纽约时报杂志》的特约撰稿人，也是Talk专栏的撰稿人。他最近就离开YouTube采访了Emma Chamberlain，就一个更愚蠢的美国采访了Walter Mosley ，就一种新的工作方式采访了Cal Newport。 翻译：纽约时报中文网 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道习近平领导下的中国逐渐远离世界2023年3月24日 中俄友谊凸显北京对西方“遏制”的恐惧2023年3月23日 美国情报机构就中国威胁发出警告2023年3月9日 美国扩大美印合作，对抗中国技术崛起2023年2月1日 最受欢迎金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？ 阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市 深陷债务泥潭的中国地方政府为何仍大兴基建？ 台湾前总统马英九历史性访问中国大陆 FTX创始人被控向中国官员行贿4000万美元 TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话 中国副总理何立峰：主管经济的习近平忠诚追随者 从“中国制造”到“美国制造” 为什么“中国金融末日”没有成为现实 谎言、争吵和欺诈：乌克兰战争中不光彩的美国志愿者 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2023 The New York Times Company.

从“中国制造”到“美国制造”The Lure of the ‘Made in America’ Sales PitchPETER S. GOODMAN2023年3月29日 FutureStitch生产线，这家生产设计师袜子的公司会雇佣曾经入狱的女性。 JOHN FRANCIS PETERS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMESAs a teenager in Southern California, Taylor Shupe confidently declared plans to one day lead a global company, an ambition that would surely bring him to China. By the time he was 15, he was studying Mandarin. 还是一个南加州少年的时候，泰勒·舒佩就曾自信地宣告，有朝一日他会执掌一家跨国公司，这样的抱负自然会驱使他前往中国。15岁的时候，他已经开始学中文了。 During a college semester in China, Mr. Shupe lined up a factory that could make products for his latest venture: selling protective cases for laptop computers. 读大学期间，舒佩在中国找到一家工厂为他最近的创业项目生产产品，也就是销售笔记本电脑的保护套。 Later, he oversaw production for a start-up called Stance, which relied on factories in China to make premium socks adorned with bold colors, surfer patterns and price tags reaching $25 a pair. His current business, a sock company called FutureStitch, also makes most of its wares in China. 后来，他在一家叫Stance的创业公司负责生产，这家公司依赖中国的工厂生产色彩艳丽、有冲浪图案的精品袜子，每双售价可达25美元（约合人民币170元）。他目前经营的企业是一家叫FutureStitch的袜子公司，多数产品也是在中国生产。 But along the way, the world in which Mr. Shupe came of age yielded to something different. The era of globalization that shaped his early entrepreneurial forays was centered on China. The next phase, now unfolding, is dominated by hostilities between Washington and Beijing. 然而一路走来，世界正变成和他少时截然不同的样子。塑造了他早年创业生涯的全球化时代是以中国为中心的。而眼下正在揭开的下一阶段将以华盛顿和北京的敌对为主导。 The animosity and suspicion was on full display Thursday as a congressional hearing probed the links between the Chinese government and the wildly popular social media platform, TikTok. 在周四的一场国会听证会上，这种敌意和疑虑得到了充分展示。听证会的目的是调查中国政府和广受欢迎的社交媒体平台TikTok之间的关联。 “To the American people watching today, hear this. TikTok is a weapon by the Chinese Communist Party,” declared the chair of the House Energy and Commerce committee, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Republican from Washington State. “此刻在收看的美国人，听好了。TikTok是中国共产党的武器，”众议院能源和贸易委员会主席、华盛顿州共和党人凯西·麦克莫里斯·罗杰斯宣称。 Mr. Shupe, 39, had dedicated most of his adult life to sending jobs across the Pacific. He is now intent on bringing them back by transferring production to a new factory up the coast from San Diego. 如今已39岁的舒佩成年以来的大部分时间都在把工作交给太平洋彼岸。他现在有意把生产转移回圣迭戈的一家新工厂。 The trend he has embraced, known as reshoring, is the result of a series of momentous alterations to the global economy over the past decade. Labor costs rose in China. President Donald J. Trump slapped tariffs on Chinese imports. And President Biden ratcheted up pressure designed to contain China’s economic might. In Washington, two political parties that agreed on almost nothing achieved consensus that China represented a threat to the American way of life. 他顺应了这种被称为“回流”的趋势，其诱因是过去十年全球经济发生的一系列重大变革。中国的劳动力成本上升了。特朗普总统向中国进口征收关税。拜登总统进一步增加压力，以求制约中国的经济实力。在华盛顿，几乎不存在任何共识的两党倒是一致认为中国对美国人民的生活方式构成了威胁。 By the time the pandemic arrived, multiplying the costs of transporting goods across the Pacific, Mr. Shupe was already feeling a sense of urgency to make products closer to home. 随着大流行的到来，太平洋两岸间的运输成本成倍增加，舒佩已经感受到在更近的地方制造产品的必要性。 “With goods coming from China, there’s always going to be the Pacific Ocean that you have to transcend,” he said. “从中国发货，无论如何都得跨越太平洋，”他说。 He opened his new factory, in Oceanside, Calif., in the summer. On a recent afternoon, only 20 people were working there, wielding machinery to apply decorative designs to blank socks imported from China. But Mr. Shupe plans to more than double his work force by the end of the year. 去年夏天，他在加州欧申赛德开了一家新工厂。近日一个下午，厂里只有20个人在工作，使用机器给中国进口的空白袜子加上装饰设计。不过舒佩计划在今年内将人力增加一倍以上。 “We’re headed to a state of hyper-localization,” he said as he zipped down the freeway toward the factory in his Tesla, at alarming speed. “The big disruptions that have occurred over the past three years have definitely exposed the sort of risk that we didn’t think existed. Which brands want to set up new supply chains in China now?” “我们正在走向一种超本地化，”他一边说着，一边驾驶他的特斯拉，在高速路上以令人胆颤的速度驶向他的工厂。“过去三年发生了天翻地覆的变化，无疑曝露了我们以前未曾意识到的风险。现在还有什么品牌会想在中国建立新的供应链呢？” Mr. Shupe had to factor in the pitfalls of continuing to rely on textiles from China amid horrific accounts of human rights abuses against Uyghurs, the ethnic minority in the Chinese province of Xinjiang — a major source of cotton. American sanctions prohibited any products linked to Xinjiang from entering the United States. 随着对中国新疆维吾尔少数民族的人权侵犯恶行的曝光，舒佩必须考虑到继续依赖中国产面料带来的隐患——新疆是重要的棉花产地。美国制裁措施禁止一切和新疆有关的产品进入美国。 FutureStitch的创始人泰勒·舒佩在公司位于美国的工厂和设计团队开会。 JOHN FRANCIS PETERS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMESMade in China has also become a branding liability. “中国制造”也成了一种品牌负担。 First and foremost an entrepreneur, Mr. Shupe and his fellow start-up founders divined that high-end socks were a retail frontier waiting to be exploited, a mass commodity that could be transformed into a platform for individual expression. But expression entailed values. 舒佩首先是一名企业家，他和其他初创公司创始人预见到，高端袜子是一个有待开发的零售前沿，是一种可以转变为个人表达平台的大众商品。但是表达包含了价值观。 He understood that the Americans whose feet he was wooing were increasingly prone to viewing China as unsavory, and even malevolent. 他明白，他正在争取的美国人越来越倾向于认为中国令人讨厌，甚至怀有恶意。 He understood how social media and celebrity endorsements could drive consumer impulses. Traditional advertising couldn’t rival the power of an Instagram post showing an N.B.A. legend donning Stance socks, or the Jay-Z song that celebrated the glories of the brand. (“This ain’t gray sweatsuits and white tube socks. This is black leather pants and a pair of Stance.”) 他了解社交媒体和名人代言如何刺激消费者的冲动。传统广告无法与Instagram上NBA传奇球星穿Stance袜子的帖子或Jay-Z歌颂该品牌有多么杰出的歌曲相比。（“不是灰色运动服和白色筒袜。是黑皮裤和一双Stance。”） China was a damaging detail in the story of Mr. Shupe’s product. Manufacturing socks in the United States was part of a new narrative, one which puts his customers on the right side of history, investing in American communities and responding to climate change by limiting carbon emissions from shipping containers streaming across the ocean. 在舒佩的产品故事中，中国是一个不光彩的细节。在美国生产袜子是新叙事的一部分，这种叙事让他的客户站在历史正确的一边，为美国社区投资，通过限制远洋集装箱的碳排放来应对气候变化。 “Consumers want to know where things are made more than ever,” Mr. Shupe said. “And how things are made.” “消费者比以往任何时候都更想知道产品是在哪里生产的，”舒佩说。“还有东西是怎么造出来的。” He had engineered an answer to that second question by partnering with local government agencies to hire formerly incarcerated women, most of them Black and Latina. They bore trauma from past experiences with substance abuse, domestic violence and prostitution. They confronted racial discrimination and unemployment rates reaching 35 percent. And there were the everyday struggles of single motherhood, rent to pay and groceries to buy in a society that tended to write them off. 对于第二个问题，他设计了一个回答：他与当地政府机构合作，雇佣曾经入狱的女性，其中大多数是黑人和拉丁裔。这些女性曾因滥用药物、家庭暴力和卖淫的经历而受到创伤。她们面临着种族歧视和高达35%的失业率。而且，在一个倾向于将她们排除在外的社会中，她们还面临着单亲母亲的日常困境，有房租要付，有食品杂货要买。 People like Tasha Almanza, a mother of four who had served time for selling drugs, were at the center of the brand’s narrative. 塔莎·阿尔曼扎是四个孩子的母亲，曾因贩毒入狱，她是这个品牌故事的中心人物。 “We are women working together,” Ms. Almanza said. “We’re here to empower each other. This has given me the opportunity to rebuild my life.” “我们是一起工作的女性，”阿尔曼扎说。“我们在这里是为了彼此赋权。这给了我重建生活的机会。” Industrial construction boom 工业建设热潮 Most of the attention to bringing manufacturing back has been centered on weightier concerns than socks. 人们对制造业回归的关注大多集中在比袜子更重要的问题上。 Mr. Trump encouraged the production of Covid vaccines, in part by reserving supplies of key ingredients and equipment needed by domestic pharmaceutical companies. Mr. Biden expanded on those efforts, accelerating the availability of vaccines. 特朗普鼓励生产新冠疫苗，部分是通过储备国内制药公司所需的关键成分和设备。拜登进一步扩展了这些努力，加快了疫苗的供应。 Mr. Biden maintained the Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese imports, while opening a new front in the trade war: computer chips. Under the CHIPS and Science Act, which was signed in August, the president unleashed $52 billion worth of direct subsidies to encourage companies to produce computer chips at factories in the United States. 拜登维持了特朗普政府对中国进口商品征收的关税，同时在贸易战中开辟了一条新战线：计算机芯片。根据今年8月签署的《芯片与科学法案》，总统释放了价值520亿美元的直接补贴，鼓励企业在美国的工厂生产芯片。 FutureStitch位于加利福尼亚州欧申赛德的工厂于去年夏天开工。舒佩计划在年底前将员工人数增加一倍以上。 JOHN FRANCIS PETERS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES“我们是一起工作的女性，”塔莎·阿尔曼扎说，她认为自己在FutureStitch的工作岗位不仅仅是一份工作。“我们在这里是为了彼此赋权。” JOHN FRANCIS PETERS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMESAdministration officials heralded the law as liberation from the constant vulnerability of relying on chip-makers in Taiwan, a self-governing island only 100 miles off the Chinese coast that is claimed by Beijing. 政府官员宣称，该法案将使美国摆脱对台湾芯片制造商的长期依赖。台湾是一个自治岛屿，距离中国海岸仅160公里，北京宣称对其拥有主权。 The government has also used tax credits to promote the domestic production of electric cars and batteries. 政府还利用税收抵免来促进国内电动汽车和电池的生产。 The result has been an industrial construction boom across the United States. 其结果是美国各地出现了工业建设热潮。 By the end of 2022, the chip industry had dedicated almost $200 billion to build and expand 40 factories in 16 states, generating 40,000 future jobs, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association. A similar sum of money has been promised for American plants making electric cars and batteries, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council, an advocacy group. 根据半导体行业协会的数据，到2022年底，芯片行业已投入近2000亿美元，在16个州建造和扩建40家工厂，未来将创造四万个就业机会。据倡导组织自然资源保护委员会称，政府已承诺向生产电动汽车和电池的美国工厂提供类似规模的资金。 “This is about creating something here.” “这是为了在这里创造一些东西。” Even as wages have risen in China in recent years, and even as shipping has proved volatile, the costs of making socks in California remains significantly higher than manufacturing in China, Mr. Shupe acknowledges. That basic reality is not likely to change any time soon and leaves the fate of his proposition uncertain. Still, he is betting that Americans will ultimately prove willing to pay more for products made at home. 舒佩承认，尽管近年来中国的工资水平有所提高，航运也不稳定，但在加州生产袜子的成本仍然远高于在中国生产。这一基本现实不太可能很快改变，也导致很难确定他的这步棋会有什么结果。不过，他认为美国人最终会愿意为国内制造的产品支付更高的价格。 Raised in Orange County, on a classic, sun-splashed chunk of the Pacific Coast, he surfed and skateboarded as a kid, gaining familiarity with the sartorial concerns of people who sought to look cool and feel comfortable at the same time. 他在奥兰治县长大，那里阳光明媚，是一处典型的太平洋海滨地带。他小时候玩冲浪、玩滑板，熟悉那些既想看起来很酷，又想感觉舒适的人对服装有什么要求。 From early childhood, he was constantly engaged in one entrepreneurial venture or another. 他从小就不断从事这样或那样的创业。 “Every Christmas, I’d ask for things that would allow me to generate money,” he recalled. One year, it was a lemon crusher allowing him to make lemonade. Other years, he got a cotton-candy machine, a snow-cone maker, a rock polisher — all harnessed to yield products he sold to the neighbors. “每年圣诞节，我都会要能让我赚钱的东西，”他回忆。有一年，他想要一个柠檬榨汁机来做柠檬水。还有几次，他得到了棉花糖机、冰淇淋机、石料抛光机——所有这些都用来生产产品，卖给邻居。 At 12, he was hawking boxes of chocolates and trinkets door to door. Then he worked as a delivery boy at a florist run by a man from Taiwan, using it as an opportunity to learn rudimentary Mandarin. 12岁时，他挨家挨户地兜售巧克力和小饰品。后来，他在一个台湾人开的花店当配送员，利用这个机会学习了基本的中文。 Mr. Shupe was raised a devout Mormon, though he is no longer an adherent. He was dispatched as a missionary to Taiwan, an experience he now views as a colonial enterprise, even as he appreciates what it gained him: complete fluency in Mandarin. 舒佩从小是虔诚的摩门教徒，不过现在已经不是了。他曾被派往台湾传教，如今他把这段经历视为殖民主义事业，尽管他喜欢这段经历给他带来的好处：能说一口流利的中文。 JOHN FRANCIS PETERS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMESJOHN FRANCIS PETERS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES“The objective was to convert,” Mr. Shupe said. “I became very competitive.” “目标是劝人皈依，”舒佩说。“我变得非常好胜。” Two years later, he returned to the United States and enrolled at Brigham Young University. By the time he landed in China for an exchange semester at Nanjing University, he was eager to line up a supplier of neoprene for his business making protective sleeves for laptops. 两年后，他回到美国，进入杨百翰大学学习。作为交换生来到中国的南京大学时，他急于为自己生产笔记本电脑保护套的业务找到一家氯丁橡胶供应商。 He found a factory in southern China. The business grew, and Circuit City became his largest customer. But when the chain of electronics stores disappeared into bankruptcy in 2009, Mr. Shupe liquidated his inventory and shut down the business. 他在中国南方找到了一家工厂。生意越做越大，Circuit City成了他最大的客户。但当这家电子产品连锁店在2009年破产时，舒佩清空了库存，关闭了自己的公司。 The same year, he joined with three other entrepreneurs to start Stance, a brand premised on the idea that socks were ripe for reinvention. They initially focused on skateboarders, using stretchy material that applied light compression to stop them from sliding down calves, while employing the designs of artists from Southern California. 同年，他与其他三位创业者一起创立了Stance品牌，其出发点是袜子这东西已经到了改头换面的时候。他们最初专注于为滑板玩家服务，使用有弹性的材料，可以施加轻微的压力，防止袜子从小腿滑下来，同时采用南加州艺术家的设计。 They worked with a factory outside Shanghai, to make their products. Mr. Shupe supervised production, initially flying every few weeks between California and China. But the lack of daily supervision caused trouble. Machinery mysteriously disappeared from the factory. Orders got screwed up amid long-distance communication problems. After six perpetually jet-lagged months, he moved to China, living near the factory for six years. 他们与上海以外的一家工厂合作生产自己的产品。舒佩负责监督生产，最初，他每隔几周就在加州和中国之间飞行。但缺乏日常监管引发了麻烦。机器从工厂里神秘地消失了。由于长途通信问题，订单被搞砸了。经历了六个月的时差反应后，他搬到中国，在工厂附近住了六年。 When he started FutureStitch in 2017, he held on to Stance’s operation in China. 2017年创办FutureStitch时，他保留了Stance在中国的业务。 From the beginning, he had intended to eventually establish a factory in the United States, but a series of developments accelerated the timetable. 从一开始他就打算最终在美国建厂，但一系列的事态发展加快了这一进程。 First came the trade war, and then the pandemic, adding cost and delay. A single Covid case in 2020 at his factory in China forced the entire work force to quarantine, shutting down the operation for three weeks. 先是贸易战，然后是大流行，成本和延误增加了。2020年，他在中国的工厂出现一个新冠病例，所有工人都被迫隔离，工厂停产了三周。 FutureStitch has contracts to make socks for Stance and other brands. Every month, it ships between 20 and 30 containers — each 40-feet long — to Southern California from China. But the costs of transportation multiplied. The time needed to get products to market increased to 10 weeks from three weeks. FutureStitch手里有为Stance和其他品牌生产袜子的合同。每个月，该公司从中国向南加州运送20到30个集装箱——每个集装箱长40英尺（约合12米）。但是运输成本成倍增长。将产品推向市场所需的时间从3周增加到10周。 This was especially troubling given Mr. Shupe’s fixation with customized goods, which require speed to take advantage of momentary trends. He was pursuing plans to release socks with photographic images of key highlights in sporting events — the game-winning shot in the N.B.A. Finals, the triumphant horse crossing the finish line at the Kentucky Derby. 舒佩对定制商品非常执着，这尤其棘手，要抓住转瞬即逝的趋势就要高速生产。他正在推行计划，推出印有体育赛事经典瞬间的袜子——NBA总决赛的制胜投篮，或是骏马在肯塔基赛马会上冲过终点线的胜利时刻。 “You look at the moment, the heat of the meme,” he said. “By the end of the month, it’s not even a tenth what it was.” “你要抓住那个瞬间，米姆最火的时候，”他说。“到月底，甚至连原来的十分之一都不到。” FutureStitch艺术和工艺项目的细节。 JOHN FRANCIS PETERS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES舒佩认为，美国人最终会愿意为国内制造的产品支付更高的价格。 JOHN FRANCIS PETERS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMESHere was the impetus to set up the new factory in Oceanside. 这就是在欧申赛德建立新工厂的动力。 Mr. Shupe is the father of three, but the presence of single, working mothers whose time is especially compressed has supplied him marketable insights into the everyday problems of footwear, such as the casual torture of putting shoes and socks on small children with other ideas. This was the genesis for his latest obsession, a cross between a shoe and a sock that has a strong sole, yet can be worn by itself and tossed in the washing machine. 舒佩是三个孩子的父亲，但他的适销对路的灵感来自许多时间特别紧迫的单身职业母亲们，她们在日常遇到穿鞋相关的问题，例如给小孩子穿上鞋袜，而孩子不愿意，这很折磨人。他最近痴迷的产品受此启发，这是一种鞋和袜子的结合体，鞋底结实，但可以单独穿着，又可以直接机洗。 On a recent morning, Mr. Shupe convened his design team to examine a prototype. The outsole will be made of Vibram, which is made in the United States from recycled materials. And the product could be fashioned through five stages of manufacturing, compared with the 80 or 90 involved in some footwear. 最近的一个早晨，舒佩召集了他的设计团队来检验产品原型。鞋的外底将使用Vibram制成，这种材料在美国由回收材料制成。与某些鞋类涉及的80或90个制造步骤相比，该产品只要五个步骤就可以完成。 “It has all the right formulas for ‘Made in the U.S.A.,’” Mr. Shupe said. “This is about creating something here in the United States with interesting design. We’d have to story tell about this.” “它拥有‘美国制造’的所有正确要素，”舒佩说。“这是在美国，用有趣的设计，创造一些东西。这是我们需要去讲的故事。” Peter S. Goodman是时报全球经济记者，常驻纽约。他曾是驻伦敦的欧洲经济记者，也曾在08年经济危机期间报道美国国家经济。他还曾任《华盛顿邮报》上海分社社长。欢迎在Twitter上关注他：@petersgoodman。 翻译：纽约时报中文网 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道科技公司逐步将供应链转移出中国2022年9月2日 美国涉新疆强迫劳动禁令生效2022年6月23日 全球供应链崩溃是什么体验2022年4月7日 供应链大混乱下的美国港口危机2021年10月12日 最受欢迎金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？ 阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市 深陷债务泥潭的中国地方政府为何仍大兴基建？ 台湾前总统马英九历史性访问中国大陆 FTX创始人被控向中国官员行贿4000万美元 TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话 中国副总理何立峰：主管经济的习近平忠诚追随者 从“中国制造”到“美国制造” 为什么“中国金融末日”没有成为现实 谎言、争吵和欺诈：乌克兰战争中不光彩的美国志愿者 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2023 The New York Times Company.

TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话What’s Hot on TikTok? Defending Its C.E.O.SAPNA MAHESHWARI, KALLEY HUANG2023年3月29日 TikTok用户发布了以该应用程序首席执行官周受资为主题的视频剪辑，配上流行音乐的曲调，并采用了通常用在名人身上的“饭拍”方式。 HAIYUN JIANG/THE NEW YORK TIMESThe latest viral trend on TikTok is defending TikTok. TikTok上最新的热门走红趋势是捍卫TikTok。 “Now is the time to fight the ban on TikTok,” read a caption of a TikTok video that was posted on Thursday about the app’s future. “#savetiktok #keeptiktok.” “是时候对抗TikTok禁令了，”周四发布的一段关于该应用程序未来的TikTok视频的标题写道。“#savetiktok（救救TikTok） #keeptiktok（保住TikTok）。” “Do I believe TikTok should be banned? No,” Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Democrat of New York, said on Friday in her first TikTok video, which netted more than 3.7 million views. “我认为TikTok应该被禁吗？不，”纽约民主党众议员亚历山德里娅·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯周五在她的第一个TikTok视频中说，该视频获得了超过370万次观看。 Other TikTok users shared video montages of the app’s chief executive, Shou Chew, to the tune of pop songs and applied the “fancam” treatment typically reserved for celebrities. 还有一些TikTok用户发布了以该应用程序首席执行官周受资为主题的视频剪辑，配上流行音乐的曲调，并采用了通常用在名人身上的“饭拍”方式。 Across TikTok, users have in recent days leaped to the defense of the popular video app, which is owned by the Chinese company ByteDance. In hundreds of videos, they have argued that the app should not be banned in the United States over national security concerns, questioned why American social media apps aren’t facing similar scrutiny and expressed concerns that their First Amendment rights are under attack. 最近几天，在TikTok上，用户纷纷为这款中国公司字节跳动拥有的短视频应用程序辩护。数百个视频中的用户争辩说，TikTok不应以国家安全考虑为由在美国被禁止，质疑为什么美国的社交媒体应用程序没有面临类似的审查，并表示担心他们的第一修正案权利被侵犯。 The outcry follows rising concerns from lawmakers and the Biden administration over whether TikTok provides sensitive data about American users to Chinese authorities. On Thursday, Mr. Chew appeared before Congress and was grilled for roughly five hours, with lawmakers questioning whether TikTok was spying on Americans on behalf of the Chinese government, endangering young people with toxic content and invading people’s privacy. 此前，立法者和拜登政府越来越担心TikTok是否向中国当局提供了有关美国用户的敏感数据。周四，周受资出现在国会听证会上并被盘问了大约五个小时，立法者质疑TikTok是否在替中国政府对美国人进行间谍活动，用有害内容危害年轻人并侵犯人们的隐私。 Mr. Chew said TikTok had a plan to protect American user data and denied that the Chinese government controlled ByteDance. But his answers were largely met with derision by lawmakers, fueling calls for TikTok to be banned entirely from Apple’s and Google’s app stores in the United States. The Biden administration has also pushed for TikTok to be separated from ByteDance through a sale, a move that China has opposed, or for it to try to strike an agreement with the U.S. government over data security concerns. 周受资表示，TikTok已制定计划保护美国用户数据，并否认中国政府控制了字节跳动。但他的回答在很大程度上遭到了立法者的嘲讽，这加剧了要求完全禁止TikTok出现在美国的苹果和谷歌应用程序商店的呼声。拜登政府还推动通过出售TikTok将其与字节跳动分离——这遭到了中国的反对，或者促使它与与美国政府就数据安全问题达成协议。 But on TikTok itself, lawmakers’ concerns landed with a thud. 但在TikTok上，立法者的这些关切遭到痛击。 “There needs to be an age limit on congressional positions bc this was so embarrassing,” one user wrote in the caption of a video posted on Friday. “需要给国会职位加年龄限制，太丢人了，”一位用户在周五发布的一段视频的标题中写道。 Many were solidly against a TikTok ban in the United States. Doctors, self-defense experts, parenting influencers and others shared videos saying they were already researching ways to maintain access to the app even if it became banned and blamed Facebook and Google for the criticism. 许多人坚决反对在美国禁止TikTok。医生、防身术专家、育儿网红等等人士都发布了视频，称他们已经在研究如何在TikTok被禁止的情况下保持正常使用，并将TikTok受到的非难归咎于Facebook和谷歌。 The hashtag #TikTokBan had 1.7 billion views on Monday, up from 983 million on March 18. #TikTokBan（TikTok禁令）标签在周一的浏览量为17亿，大大高于3月18日的9.83亿。 Many TikTok users also rallied behind Mr. Chew, who is Singaporean. They highlighted lawmakers asking the executive yes or no questions and then interrupting him. They also portrayed Mr. Chew’s responses as wins against uninformed lawmakers, who sometimes posed basic questions about the internet. 许多TikTok用户还支持新加坡人周受资。他们截取了立法者向这位高管询问非黑即白的问题并打断他的画面。他们还称周受资的回应战胜了无知的立法者，这些立法者有时会就互联网提出非常初级的问题。 And they made their displeasure known in their videos. Some users cut together older photos of Mr. Chew and clips from the hearing with viral TikTok songs, like Chris Brown’s “Under the Influence.” One user posted videos of the “Schitt’s Creek” character David Rose sighing and rolling his eyes to express disdain for lawmakers’ questions. One account shared a video of a young child responding to the clips with exasperation. 他们发布视频来表达他们的不满。一些用户将周受资的旧照片和听证会的片段与TikTok热门歌曲剪辑在一起，例如克里斯·布朗的《Under the Influence》。一位用户发布了《富家穷路》(Schitt's Creek)角色大卫·罗斯叹息和翻白眼的视频，以表达对立法者问题的蔑视。在一个账号发布的一段视频中，一个幼儿在恼怒地回应听证会片段。 The response was probably what TikTok had hoped for. Mr. Chew, who has avoided the public eye for much of his tenure as chief executive, posted a video last week on TikTok’s main account and told American users that lawmakers “could take TikTok away from all 150 million of you.” He posted another video after the hearing, reiterating TikTok’s messages to lawmakers. Each video received more than 25 million views. 这种回应可能是TikTok所希望的。在担任首席执行官的大部分时间里，周受资都避开了公众的视线，他上周在TikTok的官方账户上发布了一段视频，告诉美国用户，立法者“可以将TikTok从你们所有1.5亿人手中夺走”。他在听证会后发布了另一个视频，向立法者重申了TikTok的要旨。两个视频的观看次数分别都超过2500万次。 “It seems clear that much of America did not experience the hearing the same way many members of Congress and political insiders did,” Brooke Oberwetter, a spokeswoman for TikTok, said in a statement. TikTok发言人布鲁克·奥伯韦特在一份声明中表示：“很明显，大部份美国人对听证会的感想与许多国会议员和政治内部人士不同。” Mr. Chew’s messages were apparently taken to heart by some fans who posted on TikTok that they found him attractive. One video spliced photos of Mr. Chew to the beat of lyrics from the K-pop girl group New Jeans: “Oh my, oh my God, I was really hoping that he will come through.” The caption read, “Come through for us shou oppa,” referring to a Korean term for older men. It garnered more than 4.3 million views. 周受资的话深得一些粉丝的喜欢，他们在TikTok上发布视频说觉得他很有魅力。一段视频将周受资的照片与K-pop女子组合NewJeans的歌词组成卡点视频：“天哪，天哪，我真的希望他能渡过难关。”标题写道，“为了我们渡过难关周欧巴”，欧巴指的是韩语中对年长男性的称呼。这条视频获得了超过430万次观看。 Others called Mr. Chew, 40, who is married with two children, a “zaddy,” a slang term that rhymes with “daddy” and refers to older, attractive men. 还有人管现年40岁、已婚并育有两个孩子的周受资叫“zaddy”，这个与“daddy”押韵的俚语指的是有魅力的老男人。 “If TikTok bad, why is he Fine???” one user posted in a video with three-million-plus views. “shou zi chew didn’t chew he devoured,” one comment, which had some 29,000 likes, said under another video supporting the TikTok chief executive. “如果TikTok不好，为什么他这么好？？？”一位用户发布了一段视频，观看次数超过300万次。在另一个支持TikTok首席执行官的视频下，一条评论说：“周受资不细嚼慢咽，他会把你一口活吞。”（英文中周的姓氏Chew可理解为咀嚼。——译注）该评论获得约2.9万个赞。 Mr. Chew, who had fewer than 20,000 followers on his personal TikTok account on March 21, now has 557,000, according to Trendpop, a social media analytics firm. 社交媒体分析公司Trendpop的数据显示，周受资的个人TikTok账户上的粉丝在3月21日不到2万，现在已有55.7万。 TikTok users also mocked some of the questions from lawmakers. One target of their ire was Representative Richard Hudson, Republican of North Carolina, who asked Mr. Chew at last week’s hearing if TikTok “can access the home Wi-Fi network.” The exchange — including Mr. Chew’s puzzled response saying, “Only if the user turns on the Wi-Fi” — was shared in multiple posts. TikTok用户还嘲笑了立法者提出的一些问题。他们的怒火指向的目标之一是北卡罗来纳州共和党众议员理查德·哈德森，他在上周的听证会上询问周受资TikTok是否“可以连到家庭Wi-Fi网络”。许多视频包含了这段对话，包括周受资困惑的回应：“只有当用户打开Wi-Fi之后。” One caption read, “We’re … not entirely sure … if Rep. Richard Hudson knows how TikTok OR WiFi works?” Another caption featured a series of wide-eyed blushing emojis. 一条视频的标题写道：“我们……不是很确定……理查德·哈德森议员是否知道TikTok或WiFi是怎么回事？”另一个视频的标题里包含了一系列脸红惊讶的表情符号。 Sapna Maheshwari是一名商业记者，报道TikTok和新兴媒体公司的新闻。她此前报道零售和广告业。欢迎在Twitter和Facebook上关注她。 Kalley Huang是一名科技报道研究员，常驻旧金山。她毕业于北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校。欢迎在Twitter上关注她：@KalleyHuang。 翻译：纽约时报中文网 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道国会听证会猛烈抨击TikTok2023年3月24日 美国司法部对字节跳动展开调查2023年3月20日 要为TikTok找到买家没那么容易2023年3月17日 拜登政府要求字节跳动出售TikTok2023年3月16日 最受欢迎金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？ 阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市 深陷债务泥潭的中国地方政府为何仍大兴基建？ 台湾前总统马英九历史性访问中国大陆 FTX创始人被控向中国官员行贿4000万美元 TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话 中国副总理何立峰：主管经济的习近平忠诚追随者 从“中国制造”到“美国制造” 为什么“中国金融末日”没有成为现实 谎言、争吵和欺诈：乌克兰战争中不光彩的美国志愿者 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2023 The New York Times Company.

欧洲多国领导人接连访问中国，权衡对华战略Even as U.S. Beckons, European Leaders Head to BeijingSTEVEN ERLANGER, MATINA STEVIS-GRIDNEFF2023年3月30日 德国总理朔尔茨（右四）11月在北京与中国总理李克强（左五）举行会谈。 POOL PHOTO BY KAY NIETFELDBRUSSELS — Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, went in November. Charles Michel of the European Council in December. Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, is visiting this week. Next week it’s France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, together with the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen. 布鲁塞尔——去年11月，德国总理朔尔茨访华。12月，欧洲理事会主席米歇尔访华。西班牙首相桑切斯本周将到访北京。下周是法国总统马克龙和欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩。 European leaders have been making a beeline to Beijing, weighing their strategy toward China just as the United States intensifies pressure to pick sides in the growing acrimony between the two superpowers. 欧洲领导人陆续直奔北京，斟酌他们的对华战略，而美国正加大压力，要求他们在两个超级大国之间日益激烈的争吵中选边站。 The flurry of diplomatic activity coincides with China’s announcement of “unlimited partnership” with Russia and Beijing’s awkward effort to mediate the war in Ukraine. China’s growing closeness to Moscow has placed Europe in a difficult spot. 在这一连串外交活动的同时，中国宣布与俄罗斯建立“无上限伙伴关系”，还为调解乌克兰战争付出了不无狼狈的努力。中俄关系的日益密切把欧洲置于一个困难处境。 On the one hand, the war in Ukraine has brought deep alignment between the European Union and the United States, which have stood united in opposition to Russia’s invasion. On the other, China is a key trading and investment partner that major European powers, especially Germany, cannot afford to alienate. 一方面，乌克兰战争加深了欧盟和美国的联盟关系，它们团结一致反对俄罗斯的入侵。另一方面，中国是欧洲主要大国——尤其是德国——无法割舍的重要贸易和投资伙伴。 At the same time, Western European countries like Germany, France and Spain, while supporting Ukraine, would like a more rapid diplomatic conclusion to the war. They see China as a possible restraint on Russia and a voice Vladimir V. Putin, Russia’s president, must listen to. And they remain hopeful that China, if not a neutral mediator, could play an important role to guarantee any eventual settlement. 与此同时，德国、法国和西班牙等西欧国家虽然支持乌克兰，但希望以外交方式更为迅速地结束战争。他们认为中国也许能够约束俄罗斯，并且俄罗斯总统普京一定会聆听北京的声音。他们仍然希望中国——即便不是作为一个中立的调解人，也能发挥重要作用，以保证最终达成解决方案。 Europe’s bind has induced no shortage of magical thinking. “It’s interesting to see the level of panic on the side of the Europeans and their slightly delusional approach,” said Janka Oertel, the director for Asia for the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. 欧洲的难题引发了不少异想天开的想法。“看到欧洲人的恐慌程度以及他们抱有幻想的做法，很有意思，”柏林的欧洲外交关系委员会亚洲事务主任扬卡·厄特尔说。 She noted that China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has just been to Moscow and reconfirmed his partnership with Mr. Putin and their joint desire to create a new world order. Now, she said, “to go to Beijing and say, ‘We go to get China to contribute to peace’ is extraordinary.” 她指出，中国领导人习近平刚刚访问了莫斯科，并重申了他与普京的伙伴关系以及他们建立新世界秩序的共同愿望。她说，现在“跑去北京说‘我们去让中国为和平做贡献’，可真是难以置信。” Europe should warn China of severe consequences if it supplies Russia with military equipment and ammunition, Ms. Oertel said. 厄特尔表示，欧洲应该警告中国，向俄罗斯提供军事装备和弹药将带来严重后果。 What the visits to Beijing achieve instead, she said, is to send an important signal to Washington: “It tells the Americans that we care about that relationship with China.” 她说，访华实际在向华盛顿发出一个重要信号：“这是在告诉美国人，我们在乎与中国的关系。” Some of the recent and scheduled visits to Beijing by European leaders were originally conceived as economically focused and postponed because of the pandemic, but Mr. Xi’s new coziness with Mr. Putin in the midst of the standoff over Ukraine has shifted the topic of conversation, and the world’s attention. 欧洲领导人近期以及计划中的访华之行有一些当初本来是以经济为重点，后来因大流行而推迟，但习近平在乌克兰僵局中与普京新形成的亲密关系转移了谈话的主题，也转移了世界的注意力。 China would like nothing more than to divide Europe from the United States, and is eager to stress that a better footing would not only be good for business, but also benefit Europe’s quest for “strategic autonomy” — maintaining its independence of action, even from the United States. 中国只想将欧洲与美国分开，并急于强调，更好的立足点不仅有利于商业，而且有利于欧洲寻求“战略自主”——保持其行动的独立性，甚至免受美国影响。 欧洲领导人近期以及计划中的访华之行，有一些当初本来是以经济为重点，后来因大流行而推迟，但习近平在乌克兰僵局中与普京新形成的亲密关系转移了谈话的主题，也转移了世界的注意力。 TYLER HICKS/THE NEW YORK TIMESWashington, for its part, would like the Europeans more firmly on its side and for the newly enhanced trans-Atlantic relationship, described by E.U. diplomats as the best it has been in decades, to include clearer alignment against China. 华盛顿方面则希望欧洲人更坚定地站在美国一边，并希望新近加强的跨大西洋关系——被欧盟外交官描述为几十年来最好的关系——涵盖对中国明确一致的反对立场。 European countries, which do not see China as a peer rival but as an increasingly troubling trading partner, would prefer that the Americans stop pushing them to adopt a tougher stance against Beijing. 欧洲国家并不将中国视为对等的竞争对手，而是一个日益令人不安的贸易伙伴，它们更希望美国人不要再敦促它们对北京采取更强硬的立场。 Diplomats said that in meetings with the U.S. authorities, for example, American policymakers have described the close coordination of E.U.-U.S. sanctions against Russia as a blueprint for possible future sanctions against China, should there be a military move against Taiwan. 外交官们表示，例如，在与美国当局的会晤中，美国政策制定者表示，如果中国针对台湾进行军事行动，欧盟和美国现在联合对俄制裁的密切协调到时候可能成为对华制裁的蓝图。 That kind of talk, the diplomats said, has unsettled European governments, which view their interests best served by not picking sides between Washington and Beijing, especially not so early in what is becoming a superpower standoff. 外交官们称，这种谈话让欧洲各国政府感到不安，他们认为最好不要在华盛顿和北京之间选边站队，尤其是在超级大国对峙的早期，这样才最符合他们的利益。 The Chinese government, meanwhile, argues that the United States does not have Europe’s best interests at heart when it comes to Ukraine. 与此同时，中国政府则认为，在乌克兰问题上，美国并没有把欧洲的最佳利益放在心上。 Last month at the Munich Security Conference, Wang Yi, China’s newly appointed foreign-policy chief, sharply criticized the United States, appealing to Europeans to act on their own. 上个月，在慕尼黑安全会议上，中国新任命的外交政策负责人王毅尖锐批评了美国，呼吁欧洲人自主行动。 “We need to think calmly, especially our friends in Europe, about what efforts should be made to stop the warfare; what framework should there be to bring lasting peace to Europe; what role should Europe play to manifest its strategic autonomy,” he said. “我们大家要开始冷静地思考，特别是欧洲的朋友们，要思考我们到底做出什么样的努力才能使这场战事停下来；我们到底要搭一个什么样的架构，才能使欧洲得到长治久安；我们到底要发挥什么样的作用，才能使欧洲真正的实现战略自主，”他说。 He suggested that Washington wanted the war to weaken Russia. “Some forces might not want to see peace talks to materialize,” he said. “They don’t care about the life and death of Ukrainians or the harm on Europe. They might have strategic goals larger than Ukraine itself.” 他暗示，华盛顿希望通过这场战争削弱俄罗斯。“可能有些势力不想让和谈取得成功，”他说。“他们关心的不是乌克兰人民的死活，也不是欧洲受到的越来越大的伤害。他们恐怕有比乌克兰更大的战略目标。” 中国领导人习近平和俄罗斯总统普京本月在莫斯科克里姆林宫举行会晤。 SERGEY KARPUHIN/SPUTNIK, VIA SHUTTERSTOCKChina has been engaged in a renewed charm offensive in Brussels, with the newly appointed ambassador Fu Cong, who took office in December, speaking warmly of China and the European Union as “two major forces upholding world peace, two big markets promoting shared development, and two great civilizations promoting human progress.” 中国在布鲁塞尔再次展开魅力攻势，去年12月上任的新任驻欧盟大使傅聪热情地称中欧是“维护世界和平的两大力量，促进共同发展的两大市场，推动人类进步的两大文明”。 The Chinese government has also been trying to resurrect a major trade deal with Brussels, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, that was nearly completed five years ago to American annoyance, announced just days before President Biden took office and despite his team’s warnings to wait. But the deal has since stalled. 中国政府也一直在试图让一项重大贸易协议——《中欧全面投资协定》起死回生。该协议在五年前近乎完成，欧盟在拜登总统就职前几天对外宣布了消息——尽管他的团队曾经警告欧盟不要急，这令美国感到恼火。但该交易此后陷入了僵局。 Resurrecting the deal seems unlikely, said Reinhard Bütikofer, one of five members of the European Parliament sanctioned by Beijing for their critical views of China after the Parliament imposed sanctions on China over the harsh treatment of Uighurs, a Muslim minority native to Xinjiang. China has been accused of crimes against humanity, which it denies, and put thousands of Uighurs into what it calls re-education camps. 赖因哈德·比蒂科费尔表示，重启该协议似乎不太可能；他是欧洲议会因对中国持批评态度而受到北京制裁的五名议员之一。此前，欧洲议会就中国残酷对待新疆穆斯林少数民族维吾尔人而对中国实施制裁。中国被指控犯有反人类罪，将数以千计的维族人投入所谓的再教育营。中国对此予以否认。 E.U. diplomats said that Mr. Fu recently suggested in private meetings that China might unilaterally lift those sanctions if Brussels would then move to complete the investment agreement, but consensus among officials is that such a move would be nearly impossible. 欧盟外交官表示，傅聪最近在私下会面时表示，如果布鲁塞尔随后采取行动完成投资协议，中国可能会单方面取消这些制裁，但官员们的共识是，这样做几乎是不可能的。 Some member states have criticized the string of European leaders’ visits to Beijing, with Latvia’s prime minister, Krisjanis Karins, saying it allowed China to “divide and rule.” 一些成员国批评了欧洲领导人对北京的一系列访问，拉脱维亚总理卡林斯称，这让中国实现“分而治之”。 But Mr. Macron on Friday defended his trip with Ms. von der Leyen. Speaking to reporters after an E.U. summit, he said he would “coordinate” with E.U. partners. “We have a European common view to engage China to the maximum,” he said, adding that the European Union spoke with a “united voice.” 但马克龙周五为自己与冯德莱恩的行程进行了辩护。他在欧盟峰会后对记者说，他将与欧盟伙伴“协调”。他说：“我们有一个欧洲的共同观点，那就是最大限度地与中国接触。”他还说，欧盟发出了“一致的声音”。 A united voice on China, however, is conspicuously absent. 然而，在中国问题上明显缺乏一致的声音。 驻欧盟大使傅聪称中欧是“维护世界和平的两大力量，促进共同发展的两大市场，推动人类进步的两大文明”。 NG HAN GUAN/ASSOCIATED PRESSMs. von der Leyen, for example, who heads up the E.U. executive branch and has worked closely with the Biden administration to draft sanctions against Russia and align policy, is seen as a China hawk. Besides the importance of trade with China, Mr. Macron is interested in a more rapid diplomatic end to the Ukraine war and has called on China to help. 例如，欧盟行政部门负责人冯德莱恩被视为对华鹰派。她曾与拜登政府密切合作，起草对俄罗斯的制裁草案，并调整政策。除了对华贸易的重要性之外，马克龙还希望通过外交途径更快地结束乌克兰战争，并呼吁中国提供帮助。 Ultimately, the string of E.U. visits to Beijing may yield little in either direction. Theresa Fallon, director of the Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies in Brussels, noted that the visits are predominantly economic in nature. 最终，欧盟对北京的一系列访问可能在两个方向上都不会产生什么效果。设在布鲁塞尔的俄罗斯欧亚研究中心主任特蕾莎·法伦指出，这些访问主要是出于经济目的。 But, she said, the visits by E.U. leaders to Beijing could benefit the Chinese government, too. In particular the addition of Ms. von der Leyen to Mr. Macron’s trip next week adds a European dimension, and the Chinese government might use her presence to show that Europe is coming around to the idea of Beijing as a potential mediator in Ukraine. 但她表示，欧盟领导人对北京的访问可能也会让中国政府受益。特别是，冯德莱恩加入马克龙下周的访问增加了欧洲的因素，中国政府可能会利用她的出现表明欧洲正在接受北京作为乌克兰问题潜在调解人的想法。 In general, Europe sees China’s vague peace proposals as pro-Russian and not a real basis for negotiations. But China matters so much economically that framing these trips as less trade than about the war, she said, is a form of “peacewashing.” 总的来说，欧洲认为中国含糊的和平提议是亲俄的，不是谈判的真正基础。但她表示，中国在经济上太重要了，把这些访问说成是为了结束战争，而不是为了贸易，这是一种“用和平来洗白”的方式。 时报欧洲首席外交记者，常驻布鲁塞尔。他此前曾在伦敦、巴黎、耶路撒冷、柏林、布拉格、莫斯科和曼谷等地进行报道。欢迎在Twitter上关注他：@StevenErlanger。 Matina Stevis-Gridneff是时报布鲁塞尔分社社长，负责报道欧盟。她此前曾报道东非，并曾为华尔街日报报道欧洲。欢迎在Twitter上关注她：@MatinaStevis。 翻译：纽约时报中文网 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道中国发布乌克兰战争立场文件2023年2月27日 “和平使者”习近平？美欧持怀疑态度2023年3月20日 乌克兰战争阴影下，欧洲已永久改变2023年3月2日 中国试图修复中欧关系但面临难题2023年2月22日 中国“通往欧洲的门户”逐步收窄2023年2月15日 最受欢迎金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？ 阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市 深陷债务泥潭的中国地方政府为何仍大兴基建？ 台湾前总统马英九历史性访问中国大陆 FTX创始人被控向中国官员行贿4000万美元 TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话 中国副总理何立峰：主管经济的习近平忠诚追随者 从“中国制造”到“美国制造” 为什么“中国金融末日”没有成为现实 谎言、争吵和欺诈：乌克兰战争中不光彩的美国志愿者 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2023 The New York Times Company.

马斯克等千余名科技领袖呼吁暂停开发更先进人工智能Elon Musk and Others Call for Pause on A.I., Citing ‘Profound Risks to Society’CADE METZ, GREGORY SCHMIDT2023年3月30日 Twitter和特斯拉的首席执行官埃隆·马斯克以及其他科技领袖批评称，开发更先进AI是一场“失控的竞赛”。BENJAMIN FANJOY/ASSOCIATED PRESSMore than 1,000 technology leaders and researchers, including Elon Musk, have urged artificial intelligence labs to pause development of the most advanced systems, warning in an open letter that A.I. tools present “profound risks to society and humanity.” 包括伊隆·马斯克在内的1000多名科技界领袖和研究人员敦促人工智能实验室暂停对最先进系统的开发，并在一封公开信中警告，AI工具“对社会和人类构成深远风险”。 A.I. developers are “locked in an out-of-control race to develop and deploy ever more powerful digital minds that no one — not even their creators — can understand, predict or reliably control,” according to the letter, which the nonprofit Future of Life Institute released on Wednesday. 这封信由非营利组织生命未来研究所在周三发表，信中说，AI开发人员“陷入了一场失控的竞赛，开发和部署越来越强大的数字思维，以至于所有人——甚至包括它们的创造者——也无法理解、预测或可靠地控制它们”。 Others who signed the letter include Steve Wozniak, a co-founder of Apple; Andrew Yang, an entrepreneur and a 2020 presidential candidate; and Rachel Bronson, the president of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which sets the Doomsday Clock. 其他署名者包括苹果联合创始人史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克，2020年总统参选人、企业家杨安泽(Andrew Yang)，以及负责设定世界“末日时钟”的《原子科学家公报》的负责人蕾切尔·布朗森。 “These things are shaping our world,” said Gary Marcus, an entrepreneur and academic who has long complained of flaws in A.I. systems, in an interview. “We have a perfect storm of corporate irresponsibility, widespread adoption, lack of regulation and a huge number of unknowns.” “这些东西正在塑造我们的世界，”长期以来批评AI系统缺陷的企业家、学者加里·马库斯在接受采访时说。“我们面临着不负责任的企业、广泛应用、监管缺失和大量未知因素引发的‘完美风暴’。” A.I. powers chatbots like ChatGPT, Microsoft’s Bing and Google’s Bard, which can perform humanlike conversations, create essays on an endless variety of topics and perform more complex tasks, like writing computer code. ChatGPT、微软必应和谷歌的Bard等聊天机器人的背后都有AI，它们能够像人类一样进行对话，撰写各种主题的文章，执行诸如计算机编程等更复杂的任务。 The push to develop more powerful chatbots has led to a race that could determine the next leaders of the tech industry. But these tools have been criticized for getting details wrong and their ability to spread misinformation. 开发更强大聊天机器人的推动力已经引发了一场竞赛，有可能决定科技行业接下来的领导者。但人们批评这些工具会在细节上出错，而且会传播虚假信息。 The open letter called for a pause in the development of A.I. systems more powerful than GPT-4, the chatbot introduced this month by the research lab OpenAI, which Mr. Musk co-founded. The pause would provide time to introduce “shared safety protocols” for A.I. systems, the letter said. “If such a pause cannot be enacted quickly, governments should step in and institute a moratorium,” it added. 这封公开信呼吁暂停开发比GPT-4更强大的AI系统，该聊天机器人由OpenAI于本月推出，马斯克为该研究实验室的联合创始人。信中说，暂停开发将为人工智能系统引入“共享安全协议”提供时间。信中还说，“如果无法快速实施这样的暂停，政府应该介入并制定暂停期。” Development of powerful A.I. systems should advance “only once we are confident that their effects will be positive and their risks will be manageable,” the letter said. 信中说，“只有当我们确信强大的AI系统将产生积极的影响，并且风险将是可控的时候”，才应该推进开发。 “Humanity can enjoy a flourishing future with A.I.,” the letter said. “Having succeeded in creating powerful A.I. systems, we can now enjoy an ‘A.I. summer’ in which we reap the rewards, engineer these systems for the clear benefit of all and give society a chance to adapt.” “人类可以享受AI带来的繁荣未来，”信中说。“在成功创建强大的AI系统之后，我们现在可以享受一个‘AI之夏’，在这个过程中，收获回报，设计监管系统，造福所有人，并给社会一个适应的机会。” Sam Altman, the chief executive of OpenAI, did not sign the letter. OpenAI的首席执行官萨姆·奥尔特曼没有在这封信上签名。 Mr. Marcus and others believe that persuading the wider tech community to agree to a moratorium would be difficult. But swift government action is also a slim possibility, because lawmakers have done little to regulate artificial intelligence. 马库斯和其他人认为，说服更广泛的科技界同意暂停是很困难的。但政府迅速采取行动的可能性也很小，因为立法者在监管AI方面做得很少。 Politicians in the United States don’t have much of an understanding of the technology, Representative Jay Obernolte, a California Republican, recently told The New York Times. In 2021, European Union policymakers proposed a law designed to regulate A.I. technologies that might create harm, including facial recognition systems. 加州共和党众议员杰伊·奥伯诺尔特最近对《纽约时报》表示，美国政界对这项技术了解不多。2021年，欧盟政策制定者提出了一项法律，旨在规范可能造成伤害的AI技术，包括面部识别系统。 Expected to be passed as soon as this year, the measure would require companies to conduct risk assessments of A.I. technologies to determine how their applications could affect health, safety and individual rights. 该措施预计最早将于今年通过，它要求公司对AI技术进行风险评估，以确定它们的应用将如何影响健康、安全和个人权利。 GPT-4 is what A.I. researchers call a neural network, a type of mathematical system that learns skills by analyzing data. A neural network is the same technology that digital assistants like Siri and Alexa use to recognize spoken commands, and that self-driving cars use to identify pedestrians. GPT-4就是AI研究人员所说的神经网络，一种通过分析数据来学习技能的数学系统。神经网络是Siri和Alexa等数字助理用来识别语音指令的技术，也是自动驾驶汽车用来识别行人的技术。 Around 2018, companies like Google and OpenAI began building neural networks that learned from enormous amounts of digital text, including books, Wikipedia articles, chat logs and other information culled from the internet. The networks are called large language models, or L.L.M.s. 2018年前后，谷歌和OpenAI等公司开始构建从大量数字文本中学习的神经网络，这些数字文本包括书籍、维基百科文章、聊天记录和其他从互联网上挑选出来的信息。这些网络称为大型语言模型(LLM)。 By pinpointing billions of patterns in all that text, the L.L.M.s learn to generate text on their own, including tweets, term papers and computer programs. They could even carry on a conversation. Over the years, OpenAI and other companies have built L.L.M.s that learn from more and more data. 通过在所有文本中找出数亿个模式，LLM学习自己生成文本，包括推文、学期论文和计算机程序。它们甚至可以进行对话。多年来，OpenAI和其他公司建立的LLM从越来越多的数据中学习。 This has improved their abilities, but the systems still make mistakes. They often get facts wrong and will make up information without warning, a phenomenon that researchers call “hallucination.” Because the systems deliver all information with what seems like complete confidence, it is often difficult for people to tell what is right and what is wrong. 这提高了它们的能力，但这些系统仍然会犯错。它们经常搞错事实，并且会在没有警告的情况下编造信息，这种现象被研究人员称为“幻觉”(hallucination)。由于系统似乎对其提供的所有信息完全自信，因此人们通常很难分辨什么是对的，什么是错的。 Experts are worried that these systems could be misused to spread disinformation with more speed and efficiency than was possible in the past. They believe that these could even be used to coax behavior from people across the internet. 专家们担心，这些系统可能会遭到滥用，以比过去更快、更高效的方式传播虚假信息。他们认为，这些系统甚至会被人在网上拿来影响人们的行为。 Before GPT-4 was released, OpenAI asked outside researchers to test dangerous uses of the system. The researchers showed that it could be coaxed into suggesting how to buy illegal firearms online, describe ways to make dangerous substances from household items and write Facebook posts to convince women that abortion is unsafe. 在GPT-4发布之前，OpenAI要求外部研究人员测试该系统的危险用途。研究人员表明，它可以被诱使建议如何在网上购买非法枪支，描述如何用家居用品制造危险物质，以及写Facebook帖子来说服女性堕胎是不安全的。 They also found that the system was able to use Task Rabbit to hire a human across the internet and defeat a Captcha test, which is widely used to identify bots online. When the human asked if the system was “a robot,” the system said it was a visually impaired person. 他们还发现，该系统能够使用TaskRabbit在互联网上雇佣一个人并骗过验证码测试，该测试被广泛用于在线识别机器人。当人问系统是不是“机器人”时，系统自称视障人士。 After changes by OpenAI, GPT-4 no longer does these things. 经过OpenAI的修改后，GPT-4不再做这些事情了。 For years, many A.I. researchers, academics and tech executives, including Mr. Musk, have worried that A.I. systems could cause even greater harm. Some are part of a vast online community called rationalists or effective altruists who believe that A.I could eventually destroy humanity. 多年来，许多AI研究人员、学者和包括马斯克在内的技术高管都担心，AI系统可能造成更大的危害。其中一些人属于被称为理性主义者或有效利他主义者(effective altruists)的庞大网络群体，他们认为AI最终会毁灭人类。 The letter was shepherded by the Future of Life Institute, an organization dedicated to researching existential risks to humanity that has long warned of the dangers of artificial intelligence. But it was signed by a wide variety of people from industry and academia. 这封信由生命未来研究所牵头，该组织致力于研究人类的生存风险，长期以来一直警告AI的危险。但签署者来自各行各业和学界人士。 Though some who signed the letter are known for repeatedly expressing concerns that A.I. could destroy humanity, others, including Mr. Marcus, are more concerned about its near-term dangers, including the spread of disinformation and the risk that people will rely on these systems for medical and emotional advice. 尽管签署这封信的一些人以反复表达对AI可能毁灭人类的担忧而闻名，但包括马库斯在内的其他人更担心眼前的危险，包括虚假信息的传播，以及人们依赖这些系统进行医疗和情感咨询所导致的风险。 The letter “shows how many people are deeply worried about what is going on,” said Mr. Marcus, who signed the letter. He believes the letter will be a turning point. “It think it is a really important moment in the history of A.I. — and maybe humanity,” he said. 这封信“表明许多人都对正在发生的事情深感担忧”，签署这封信的马库斯说。他相信这封信将成为一个转折点。“我认为这是AI史上——也许也是人类史上——一个非常重要的时刻，”他说。 He acknowledged, however, that those who had signed the letter might find it difficult to persuade the wider community of companies and researchers to put a moratorium in place. “The letter is not perfect,” he said. “But the spirit is exactly right.” 然而，他承认，那些签署这封信的人可能会发现，要说服更广泛的AI行业的公司和研究人员暂停很难。“这封信并不完美，”他说。“但传达的精神是完全正确的。” Cade Metz是一名科技记者，负责报道人工智能、无人驾驶汽车、机器人、虚拟现实和其他新兴领域。他曾为《连线》杂志撰稿。 欢迎在Twitter上关注他：@cademetz。 Gregory Schmidt报道突发新闻和房地产市场，他是Square Feet专栏的编辑。欢迎爱Twitter上关注他：@GregoryNYC。 翻译：明斋 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道百度发布ChatGPT竞品“文心一言”2023年3月17日 我们对GPT-4该感到兴奋还是害怕？2023年3月16日 OpenAI发布GPT-42023年3月15日 当微软聊天机器人向我示爱2023年2月17日 最受欢迎金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？ 阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市 深陷债务泥潭的中国地方政府为何仍大兴基建？ 台湾前总统马英九历史性访问中国大陆 FTX创始人被控向中国官员行贿4000万美元 TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话 中国副总理何立峰：主管经济的习近平忠诚追随者 从“中国制造”到“美国制造” 为什么“中国金融末日”没有成为现实 谎言、争吵和欺诈：乌克兰战争中不光彩的美国志愿者 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2023 The New York Times Company.

好文 亿万富翁、反共先锋和诈骗嫌犯：多面郭文贵The Undoing of Guo Wengui, Billionaire Accused of Fraud on 2 Continents傅才德, BENJAMIN WEISER2023年3月30日 2017年，中国亿万富翁郭文贵在曼哈顿的公寓里，当时他正在美国自我流放。他现在被联邦政府拘留。JAMES ESTRIN/THE NEW YORK TIMESLuc Despins, a New York bankruptcy lawyer, typically took on difficult jobs: After the energy company Enron collapsed years ago, he helped thousands of victims recover some of their money. 纽约破产律师吕克·德斯平斯经常接下困难的工作：多年前能源公司安然倒闭时，他帮助数以千计的受害者收回了部分资金。 But when Mr. Despins was appointed by a bankruptcy court last year to locate the assets of Guo Wengui, a Chinese property mogul and political provocateur who had failed to repay tens of millions of dollars to a hedge fund, the assignment presented very different challenges. 但是，当德斯平斯去年被一个破产法庭任命去寻找郭文贵的资产时，这项任务带来了非常不同的挑战，这位中国房地产大亨和政治挑衅者未能向一个对冲基金偿还数千万美元。 In November, protesters appeared outside his home and that of his ex-wife. Photographs of his daughters, along with their names and employers, were posted on Gettr, a social platform catering to the American right. A video online accused Mr. Despins of helping to build concentration camps on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. Protesters even entered his office lobby, Mr. Despins testified in court. 去年11月，抗议者出现在德斯平斯家和他前妻家外面。他女儿们的照片、名字和雇主被发布在面向美国右翼人士的社交平台Gettr上。网上一段视频指责德斯平斯代表中国共产党帮助建造集中营。德斯平斯在法庭上作证说，抗议者甚至进入了他的办公室走廊。 “Partners of the firm have been chased up the escalator, with people running — screaming, you know, ‘C.C.P. dog,’” he said. “公司的合伙人被追到自动扶梯上，你知道，那些人边跑边叫，‘共产党的走狗，’”他说。 It would be among the last of many harassment campaigns carried out in Mr. Guo’s name by his global legion of followers. Mr. Guo may now be at the end of a remarkable trajectory, from billionaire Beijing insider to fugitive critic of the Chinese Communist Party and ally of Trump Republicans. That path, fueled by bravado, ruthlessness, a keen political antenna and alleged theft, has left lingering suspicion about his allegiances. And it has now taken him from his Manhattan penthouse to his new place of residence: the Brooklyn federal detention center. 这是郭文贵全球众多追随者以他的名义发起的众多骚扰活动中的最新一例。从在北京有广泛人脉的亿万富翁，到在逃的中国共产党批评者，乃至特朗普共和党人的盟友，如今，郭文贵的非同寻常的轨迹可能已经走到了尽头。推动他在这条道路上疾驰的，是虚张声势、冷酷无情、敏锐的政治触角和据称的盗窃行为，这一切令人对他究竟效忠于谁产生了挥之不去的疑虑。如今，沿着这条道路，他从曼哈顿的顶层公寓来到了新的住所：布鲁克林联邦拘留中心。 纽约破产律师吕克·戴斯平斯被一家破产法院指定负责寻找郭文贵的资产。 BRENDAN MCDERMID/REUTERSThis month, Mr. Guo was arrested in that 9,000-square-foot apartment, charged with defrauding thousands of investors in the United States and overseas of more than $1 billion. If convicted, he could face decades in prison. Mr. Guo pleaded not guilty in Manhattan federal court and was ordered detained at the request of prosecutors, who described him as a flight risk and a danger to the community. 本月，郭文贵在那套830平米的公寓里被捕，被控诈骗数以千计美国和海外投资者，涉案金额超过10亿美元。如果罪名成立，他可能面临数十年的监禁。在曼哈顿联邦法院，郭文贵拒不认罪，在检察官的要求下，他被下令拘留，检方称他有潜逃风险，对社区构成威胁。 “Guo Wengui is such a grifter, he just understands that whatever system you are in you have to learn how to play it,” said Orville Schell, director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York, who met Mr. Guo in Beijing over a decade ago. “He had yachts, he had the whole panoply — he knew how to arrange things around him that created a sense of awe, success and invincibility.” “郭文贵就是这样一个骗子，他明白，无论你身处何种体制，你都必须学会如何操纵它，”纽约亚洲协会美中关系中心主任夏伟(Orville Schell)说。十多年前，夏伟在北京见过郭文贵。“他有游艇，他拥有一切——他知道该怎么安排周围的东西，创造一种令人敬畏、成功和不可战胜的感觉。” Mr. Guo’s lawyer, Stephen Cook, declined to comment. 郭文贵的律师史蒂芬·库克拒绝置评。 Mr. Guo rose from poverty to control a nationwide property empire centered on a $1 billion office, retail, hotel and residential complex next to the site of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. He lived in a sprawling lakeside courtyard compound in central Beijing valued at up to $230 million, with a separate barracks for his uniformed guards and a vast closet — as big as some homes — for his Brioni suits. By 2014 he ranked 74th among China’s richest people, with $2.6 billion. 郭文贵出身贫寒，后来控制了一个覆盖全中国的房地产帝国，其核心项目是2008年北京奥运会举办地附近的一座价值10亿美元的办公、零售、酒店和住宅综合体。他住在北京市中心一处价值2.3亿美元的湖滨大院里，有一个单独的营房供他的保安使用，还拥有一个巨大的衣橱——和一些人的房子那么大——用来放他的布里奥尼西装。到2014年，他以155亿元的资产位列中国富豪榜第74位。 Property empires in China rely on government connections and the free flow of cash, gifts and favors, and Mr. Guo’s links reached into the upper ranks of the country’s power structure, including Ma Jian, a senior intelligence official. 中国的房地产帝国依赖于政府关系，以及肆无忌惮的现金、礼物和人情的流动，郭文贵的关系深入到国家权力结构的高层，包括高级情报官员马建。 With Mr. Ma’s help, Mr. Guo, in the fashion of a Russian oligarch, obtained majority control of a securities business by buying out the share of a state-owned company, according to an investigation by Caixin, a Chinese newsmagazine, which also found numerous instances of Mr. Guo failing to repay large debts. Business associates who fell out with him landed in police custody. Mr. Ma subsequently said in a videotaped confession that he had accepted more than $8 million in gifts from Mr. Guo in exchange for interventions with other officials to eliminate roadblocks for his property projects, deter rivals and other strong-arming. 据中国新闻杂志财新的调查显示，在马建帮助下，郭文贵以俄罗斯寡头的方式通过买断一家国有公司的股份，获得了一家证券公司的多数控制权。财新还发现了郭文贵有多宗未能偿还大笔债务的情况。与他闹翻的商业伙伴被警方拘留。马建随后在一段录像中承认，他从郭文贵那里接受了6000多万元的礼物，作为交换，马建与其他官员进行干预，为郭文贵的房地产项目消除障碍，威慑竞争对手，并采取其他强硬手段。 “He would get calls from Ma Jian almost hourly,” Mr. Schell recalled of Mr. Guo. “They’d be bro-ing it up as if they were in a start-up together.” “他几乎每小时都会接到马建的电话，”夏伟回忆郭文贵时说。“他们关系好得就像一起在创业一样。” Mr. Guo’s wealth brought him in contact with foreign dignitaries whose names he could drop. In Beijing, he enjoyed showing visitors his photos with the former U.S. secretaries of state Henry A. Kissinger and George P. Shultz. Mr. Guo said he had met Kim Jong-un, leader of North Korea, on a trip there. He tweeted pictures of himself with the Dalai Lama; he later told The New York Times he had acted as an intermediary for the government. 郭文贵的财富让他与外国政要有了接触，他嘴边都是这些人的名字。在北京，他喜欢向来访者展示他与美国前国务卿亨利·基辛格和乔治·舒尔茨的合影。郭文贵说，他在访问朝鲜期间见过朝鲜领导人金正恩。他在Twitter上发布了自己和达赖喇嘛的合影；他后来告诉《纽约时报》，他曾为政府担任中间人。 But by early 2015, a Chinese anticorruption campaign, aimed at officials on the take from freewheeling billionaires, had ensnared Mr. Ma. In a country where the fall of a patron often puts his confidants in legal jeopardy, Mr. Guo fled before he too could be arrested, entering the United States on a tourist visa. 但到2015年初，中国开展了反腐运动，专门针对从不受约束的亿万富翁那里收钱的官员，马建也被卷入其中。在中国，保护人的倒台往往令其亲信面临法律危险，郭文贵在自己也可能被捕之前就逃跑了，持旅游签证进入了美国。 Finding Friends on the Right 寻找右翼的朋友 Once in New York, Mr. Guo went silent. Among China watchers, speculating on what this well-connected businessman might be doing became a parlor game. Mr. Guo, whose age has been variously described as 52, 54 or 55, has said his feng shui master told him that 2015 was a bad year, and it was best to stay quiet until 2017. 郭文贵在抵达纽约后保持低调。在中国观察人士当中，猜测这位人脉广泛的商人可能在做什么成了一种游戏。郭文贵的年龄有52岁、54岁或55岁等多种说法，他说他的风水师告诉他，2015年是个坏年头，最好在2017年之前保持沉默。 But there was a more obvious reason for Mr. Guo to go public in 2017: It was uncertain whether his nemesis Wang Qishan, who oversaw the anticorruption campaign, would remain in high office after a Communist Party conclave that fall. Apparently trying to influence the outcome, Mr. Guo spoke out, first on Twitter, attracting hundreds of thousands of followers, and then on YouTube, posting daily stream-of-consciousness videos. 但郭文贵在2017年开始在抛头露面还有一个更明显的原因：他的克星、监督反腐运动的王岐山是否会在那年秋天的党代会后继续身居要职，这一点还不确定。郭文贵显然想影响结果，他先在Twitter上发表了言论，吸引了数十万粉丝，然后在YouTube上每天发表意识流式的谈话视频。 Among other claims, Mr. Guo alleged that Mr. Wang headed a corrupt family with secret stakes in a Chinese conglomerate. He provided tantalizing clues and documents, but like many of his other assertions, they were impossible to verify. 郭文贵发表了各种主张，特别是指控王岐山领导着一个腐败家族，在一家中国企业集团中持有秘密股份。他提供了诱人的线索和文件，但是，就像他的其他许多其他主张一样，这些线索和文件无法得到证实。 Mr. Guo, who also goes by Miles Kwok and several other names, held court at his $68 million residence at the Sherry-Netherland with sweeping Central Park views. While buying the apartment, he provided the building’s co-op board a recommendation from former Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain. “Miles is honest, forthright and has impeccable taste,” Mr. Blair wrote in the letter, unearthed by a British tabloid in 2021. 同时会使用迈尔斯·郭(Miles Kwok)等多个名字的郭文贵在雪莉荷兰酒店一套价值6800万美元、俯瞰中央公园美景的公寓住了下来。在购买这套公寓时，他向大楼共管委员会提供了英国前首相托尼·布莱尔的推荐信。“迈尔斯诚实、直率，品味无可挑剔，”布莱尔在信中写道。2021年，一家英国小报曝光了这封信。 Mr. Blair had previously introduced Mr. Guo to Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, according to Caixin, which said Mr. Guo raised $3 billion from the emirate’s royal family. On Wednesday, prosecutors said in a court filing that the F.B.I. had found a copy of an expired United Arab Emirates passport at Mr. Guo’s New Jersey mansion, along with more than $394,000 in U.S. currency. Agents also found about 30 cellphones scattered among three of his residences, the filing said, including one under a mattress in his Manhattan apartment. 据财新报道，布莱尔此前曾将郭文贵介绍给阿布扎比王储。财新称，郭文贵从阿联酋王室募集了30亿美元。周三，检察官在一份法庭文件中称，联邦调查局在郭文贵位于新泽西州的豪宅里发现了一份过期的阿联酋护照副本，以及超过39.4万美元的钞票。文件称，特工还在他的三个住所中发现了大约30部手机，其中一部藏在他曼哈顿公寓的床垫下。 联邦调查局的一名发言人表示，郭文贵是在他位于荷兰雪利酒店的公寓里被逮捕的。 SPENCER PLATT/GETTY IMAGESMr. Guo became a hero to tens of thousands of people in the Chinese diaspora with his insider accounts of alleged corruption among top Communist Party officials. 因曝光中共高层官员涉嫌腐败内幕，郭文贵成了上万海外华人的英雄。 He also began working to connect with America’s powerful. By 2017 he was a member of Mar-a-Lago, then-President Donald J. Trump’s Florida club. When in Washington, he booked rooms at the Trump International Hotel. 他还开始努力与美国的权势人物建立联系。到2017年，他成了时任总统特朗普的佛罗里达马阿拉歌俱乐部的会员。在华盛顿时，他在特朗普国际酒店订了房间。 Mr. Guo needed friends. It was highly unusual for a prominent Chinese businessman who had been close to government officials to go on the attack. Angry that he was leveling explosive charges against leaders, Chinese officials said in April 2017 that Interpol had issued a “red notice” for his arrest. 郭文贵需要朋友。对于一个曾与政府官员关系密切的著名中国商人来说，主动出击是非常不寻常的。中国官员对他提出有关领导人的爆炸性指控感到愤怒，并于2017年4月表示，国际刑警组织已经发出了逮捕他的“红色通缉令”。 China’s government also tapped the casino mogul Steve Wynn, who ran a resort in the Chinese territory of Macau and served as finance chairman of the Republican National Committee, along with a deputy finance chair, Elliott Broidy, to prod Mr. Trump to deport the billionaire. But the effort failed. 为促使特朗普驱逐郭文贵，中国政府还找来了赌场大亨史蒂夫·韦恩，他在中国领土澳门经营一个度假村，并曾担任共和党全国委员会的财务主席；此外还找来了该委员会的财务副主席埃利奥特·布罗伊迪。但是这一努力失败了。 2020年6月，斯蒂芬·k·班农和郭文贵宣布成立“新中国联邦”，这是指一个中国政府的替代。 VIA YOUTUBETo fend off China, Mr. Guo applied for political asylum in September 2017 and moved closer into Trump circles, embracing views held by the president and the American far right. Mr. Guo soon won the support of influential Trump allies, and they won access to his money. 为了抵抗中国，郭文贵于2017年9月申请政治庇护，并且向特朗普的圈子靠拢，拥护这位总统和美国极右翼的观点。郭文贵很快就赢得了有影响力的特朗普盟友的支持，而他们反过来也得到了他的资金。 In late 2018 Stephen K. Bannon, Mr. Trump’s onetime chief strategist, became chairman of the Rule of Law Fund, billed as a $100 million effort financed by Mr. Guo to disseminate information about Communist Party corruption and to help its victims. 2018年底，曾任特朗普首席策略师的史蒂芬·K·班农成为法治基金主席，这个基金号称由郭文贵注资一亿美元，用以宣传有关中共腐败的信息，向受害人提供帮助。 “We both naturally despise the Chinese Communist Party,” Mr. Guo told The Times then. “That’s why we’ve become partners.” Mr. Bannon said of his new backer: “He really impressed me.” Their relationship deepened, with Mr. Guo lending Mr. Bannon $150,000 and later offering him a $1 million consulting contract, according to Axios. “我们都鄙视中共，这是自然的，”郭文贵当时对时报说。“这就是我们成为合作伙伴的原因。”班农对这位新资助人的评价是：“他真的给我留下了深刻印象。”两人的关系日渐加深，据Axios报道，郭文贵曾借给班农15万美元，后来还提出给他一份100万美元的咨询合同。 Mr. Guo formed GTV Media Group, which spread news to a Chinese-speaking audience through a mobile app, in April 2020. He sold shares of it, raising about $452 million from more than 5,500 people. Soon after came G-Clubs, a concierge service promising access to trendy fashion (G-Fashion) and rights to buy GTV shares. This raised another $255 million. Guo-promoted cryptocurrencies took in $500 million, according to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2020年4月，郭文贵成立了GTV传媒集团，制作了一个面向中文读者的新闻应用。他出售了该集团股份，向超过5500人募集大约4亿5200万美元的资金。接下来很快又推出礼宾服务G-Clubs，承诺可以带来时尚潮流（G-Fashion）和GTV股份购买权。这一次他又筹到2亿5500万美元。据美国证券交易委员会，郭文贵推销的加密币赚到了5亿美元。 GTV carried Mr. Bannon’s “War Room” podcast, on which Mr. Guo was a frequent guest. The two promoted vaccine skepticism and pushed unsubstantiated theories about Covid’s origins. 班农的播客“战情室”是在GTV发布的，郭本人也经常上这个节目。两人一起宣扬对疫苗的怀疑，鼓动未经证实的新冠病毒起源假说。 In June 2020 Mr. Bannon and Mr. Guo announced the New Federal State of China, an idea for an alternative Chinese government. “We will completely overthrow the Chinese Communist Party!” Mr. Guo declared against a backdrop of the Statue of Liberty and a $37 million yacht that he called his “warship.” To emphasize his goal, he released a song a few months later called “Take Down the C.C.P.,” which briefly held the No. 1 spot on the iTunes chart. 2020年6月，班农和郭文贵宣布成立新中国联邦，意在取代中国政府。郭在一艘价值3700万、被他称为“战舰”的游艇上宣告“我们会把共产党在中国彻底打倒！”，画面的背景是自由女神像。为了强调他的目标，他还在几个月后发布了歌曲《干掉共产党》(Take Down the C.C.P.)，一度冲上iTunes排行榜榜首。 But by then, Mr. Bannon had been arrested on Mr. Guo’s yacht, charged in Manhattan with defrauding hundreds of thousands of donors to an online campaign to help build a wall on the Mexican border, and of using large sums for personal expenses. Mr. Bannon pleaded not guilty and was later pardoned by Mr. Trump before trial. 但是那时班农已经在郭文贵的游艇上被逮捕，他在曼哈顿被控通过为修建墨西哥边境墙进行网上募捐欺诈了数十万名捐款人。班农做出了无罪抗辩，后来在开庭审判前被特朗普赦免。 Rallying a Base to Retaliate 纠集支持者发起报复 While Mr. Guo was building an army of followers, he was also lashing out at perceived enemies. In Beijing, he had taken down a vice mayor blocking his flagship property development by obtaining a videotape showing the married official having sex with another woman. When a magazine was investigating Mr. Guo, he accused its publisher of having a child out of wedlock with another of his opponents. 建起自己的拥趸大军的同时，郭文贵还在攻击他的假想敌。在北京，他因为自己的旗舰物业在开发时受到某副市长阻拦，用这名官员的婚外性爱录像促成他的下台。当一家杂志开始调查他时，他指称杂志出版人与他的另一个敌人有一个私生子。 In the United States, Mr. Guo’s vengeance took many forms: lawsuits, social media attacks, and the dispatching of supporters to targets’ homes and workplaces. 在美国，郭文贵会以各种不同的形式复仇：诉讼，通过社媒发起攻击，或派自己的拥趸去目标人物的家宅和工作场所。 According to a prosecutors’ memo seeking his detention, several victims told the government that after they complained to him about mishandling their money, he accused them of spying for the Chinese Communist Party, “effectively directing the wrath” of his base against them. 据一份寻求将其羁押的检察官备忘录，多名受害人向政府表示，他们曾就捐赠款项遭擅自挪用一事向郭文贵表达不满，他转而指责他们是中共间谍，“实际上就是纠集”他的支持者来对付他们。 法律学者和人权活动人士滕彪在2018年被郭文贵以诽谤罪起诉，该案后来被驳回。 JEENAH MOON FOR THE NEW YORK TIMESHe was especially harsh toward Chinese dissidents, like Teng Biao, a legal scholar and human rights activist who was imprisoned in China and later fled. Mr. Teng was an early critic of Mr. Guo, who sued him for defamation in 2018; the case was ultimately dismissed. 他对中国的异议人士格外凶狠，比如曾在中国入狱、后来逃到海外的法律学者、人权活动家滕彪。滕彪是最早开始指责郭文贵的人之一，因此在2018年被他控告诽谤，但以撤诉告终。 “After watching him for 20 minutes I realized that this guy is just a swindler,” Mr. Teng said of Mr. Guo. “He’s not somebody who wants to fight for democracy or freedom in China. He just wants to use his influence and his impact to cheat people for money.” “我用20分钟去看他，然后意识到他只是骗子，”滕彪这样评价郭文贵。“他不是那种要为中国的民主或自由抗争的人。他只是想利用他的影响力骗取他人金钱。” In December 2020, Guo supporters surrounded Mr. Teng’s home in Princeton Junction, N.J., cursing at his school-age daughters and carrying signs that accused Mr. Teng of spying for the Chinese Communist Party. Guo supporters also gathered outside the homes of several other prominent Chinese rights activists. The protesters stayed for two months, Mr. Teng recalled. 2020年12月，郭文贵的支持者包围了滕彪在新泽西州普林斯顿交叉口的家，辱骂他尚在学龄的女儿，举着指控滕彪是中共间谍的标语。郭的支持者还在其他几位中国知名人权活动家的家门口聚集过。滕彪说抗议者在那里待了两个月才走。 Mr. Guo’s actions against Chinese dissidents fueled speculation that he was somehow working in concert with the Chinese government. 郭文贵对中国异议人士的非难引起人们的猜疑，认为他可能是在配合中国政府行动。 2020年班农被提审后，新中国联的支持者在纽约联邦法院外抗议。 KEVIN HAGEN/EPA, VIA SHUTTERSTOCKAt first, some Chinese activists in the United States, including Sasha Gong, a reporter, were taken with Mr. Guo’s message. But Ms. Gong later developed suspicions about his anti-Chinese Communist Party credentials because of his attacks on dissidents and the source of his funds. “I wrote Bannon that not a penny of Guo’s money was clean, don’t take a penny of it,” she said in an interview. 包括记者龚小夏在内的一些在美中国活动人士一开始被郭文贵所吸引。但他对异议人士的攻击以及他的资金来源，让龚开始怀疑他是否真心反对中国共产党。“我给班农去信说，郭的钱没有一分是干净的，一分都不要拿，”她在一次采访中说。 A Manhattan federal judge ruling in a civil case in which Ms. Gong testified reflected on how difficult it was to determine Mr. Guo’s loyalties. “The evidence at trial does not permit the court to decide whether Guo is, in fact, a dissident or a double agent,” the judge, Lewis J. Liman, wrote. If U.S. intelligence officials have any concerns, they haven’t resulted in charges. 在一桩龚小夏作证的民事案中，一位曼哈顿联邦法官的判决书里提到，很难判断郭文贵效忠于哪一方。“本案证据不足以令本庭裁断郭是否为异议人士或双重间谍，”法官刘易斯·J·利曼说。无论美国情报官员是否存在担忧，总之在指控中并没有这方面的体现。 Far less ambiguous was Mr. Guo’s strident support for Mr. Trump. During the run-up to to the 2020 presidential election, Mr. Guo’s media network sought to damage the campaign of the Democratic nominee, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., claiming to have material from his son Hunter Biden’s laptop, including sexually explicit images. 郭文贵对特朗普的坚决支持则要明确得多。在2020年总统大选前夕，郭文贵的媒体网络曾试图破坏民主党候选人拜登的竞选，称已经掌握拜登之子亨特·拜登笔记本电脑里的材料，包括色情图片。 But Jack Maxey, a former “War Room” co-host who was working to disseminate information from the laptop, said several images posted by Mr. Guo’s network had been fabricated, and only distracted from what Mr. Maxey considered far more damaging material documenting Hunter Biden’s work with a Chinese private-equity fund. 但曾大力传播上述笔记本电脑信息的前《战情室》搭档主持人杰克·马克西说，郭文贵媒体网络上发布的许多照片都是伪造的，而且这些照片反而转移了公众对亨特·拜登与一家中国私募股权基金合作的相关材料的关注，而马克西认为这些材料的破坏力要大得多。 “He took fake photographs and claimed they came from Hunter’s laptop,” Mr. Maxey said of Mr. Guo. “他伪造了照片，并宣称它们来自亨特的笔记本电脑，”马克西在谈到郭文贵时表示。 Mr. Guo endorsed Mr. Trump’s stolen election lie, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars so proponents of his anti-C.C.P. campaign could gather in Washington for the so-called Million MAGA March that November in support of the then-president, who was refusing to concede. Mr. Guo funded a court challenge to Mr. Biden’s election victory in Georgia, reported Mother Jones magazine. Mr. Guo also funded Gettr, the social media network set up in 2021 that until recently was headed by Jason Miller, Mr. Trump’s longtime campaign adviser and spokesman. 郭文贵支持了特朗普关于选举舞弊的谎言，耗费巨资让支持他反共运动的人在11月集结华盛顿，参加所谓的“百万挺川大游行”，支持拒绝承认败选的时任总统。据《Mother Jones》杂志报道，针对拜登在佐治亚州的胜选，郭文贵出资发起了一场法庭挑战。郭文贵还资助了Gettr，这是一家创立于2021年的社交媒体网络，一直由特朗普的长期竞选顾问兼发言人杰森·米勒执掌，不久前才卸任。 That September, the S.E.C. filed civil charges against three companies tied to Mr. Guo, alleging that the firms had conducted unlawful securities offerings for his media company, which had attracted more than 5,000 investors. The companies, without admitting to or denying the allegations, agreed to pay more than $539 million to settle. 同年9月，证券交易委员会对与郭文贵有关的三家公司提起民事诉讼，指控这些公司为他的媒体公司非法发行证券，吸引到超过5000名投资者。三家公司对这些指控不置可否，同意支付超过5.39亿美元的和解费。 The S.E.C.’s suit followed lawsuits by investors who claimed they had wired money for GTV shares but received no proof of purchase, and were not given refunds they requested. Government prosecutors said this month that Mr. Guo had defrauded thousands of investors. 此前有投资者已经提起诉讼，称他们曾汇款购买GTV股份，但并未收到认购证明，也没有得到他们要求的退款。政府检察官本月表示，郭文贵对数以千计投资者进行了诈骗。 A 60-year-old woman in the Seattle area who asked to be identified only by her last name, Chen, said she had been drawn to Mr. Guo in 2019 because of his support for pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. She grew up in China during the Cultural Revolution, and her parents, both academics, had suffered. 西雅图地区一位不愿透露全名的60岁陈姓妇女说，她在2019年开始支持郭文贵，因为他力挺香港的民主抗议活动。她在文革时期的中国长大，身为学者的父母都深受其害。 Ms. Chen said she first gave $2,500 to one of Mr. Guo’s organizations, believing the money would go to help Hong Kong students escape. In May 2020, she invested $125,000 in GTV. “At the time we thought we did the right thing,” she said. When she could not get her money back, she said, she contacted the authorities and joined other aggrieved investors in suing Mr. Guo. 陈女士说，她先是给郭文贵名下的一个组织汇去2500美元，以为这笔钱能帮助香港学生逃离那里。2020年5月，她向GTV投资12.5万美元。“那时候我们以为这是正义之举，”她说。发现拿不回自己的钱后，她说她联系了当局，并与其他利益受侵害的投资人联合起诉了郭文贵。 It was one of many civil suits against Mr. Guo since his arrival in the United States. Another, festering since 2017, would bring Mr. Despins, the bankruptcy lawyer, into his orbit. 这是郭文贵抵美后面临的众多民事诉讼之一。另一起自2017年以来不断发酵的诉讼则把破产律师德斯平斯牵扯进来。 A Hong Kong-based hedge fund, the Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, had sued Mr. Guo over a $30 million debt that had ballooned with interest. In February 2021, a court ordered Mr. Guo to pay $116.4 million. But he defied the order, and by February 2022, after being penalized $500,000 a day for moving his yacht out of the court’s jurisdiction, he was ordered to pay Pacific Alliance $134 million. 总部位于香港的太盟亚洲机会对冲基金起诉了郭文贵，因为他欠下的3000万美元债务在随着利息增加不断膨胀。2021年2月，法院判令郭文贵支付1.164亿美元。但他无视判决，在因将游艇移出法庭管辖范围而被处以每天50万美元的罚款后，他于2022年2月被勒令向太盟基金支付1.34亿美元。 Days later, Mr. Guo filed for bankruptcy. That gave his followers new targets: Mr. Despins and his family. The alleged harassment they endured is detailed in court records; Mr. Despins declined to comment. 很快，郭文贵申请了破产。这让他的追随者有了新目标：德斯平斯和他的家人。法庭记录中详细记述了他们受到的骚扰。德斯平斯拒绝置评。 In recent months, Mr. Guo has abandoned the buzz cut and clean shave that he long paired with his Brioni suits. He has grown his hair, along with a salt-and-pepper beard. Last week, someone saying she was his daughter, Guo Mei, posted on his Gettr account that he was in high spirits at the pretrial detention center in Brooklyn. He was playing basketball to stay in shape. 近几个月来，郭文贵不再保持一直以来搭配布里奥尼西装的寸头平整、脸庞光净的造型。他留长了头发，胡须花白。上周，一个自称是他的女儿郭美的人通过他的Gettr账号上发文称，他在布鲁克林的审前拘留中心状态良好。为了保持身材，他还打起了篮球。 Kenneth P. Vogel对本文有报道贡献。 傅才德(Michael Forsythe)是时报调查记者。他曾担任驻香港记者，报道中国金钱与政治的交集。他还曾在彭博新闻社工作，是一名美国海军老兵。欢迎在Twitter上关注他：@PekingMike。 Benjamin Weiser是报道曼哈顿联邦法院的记者。他长期作为专线记者和调查记者报道刑事司法。在1997年加入时报之前，他在《华盛顿邮报》供职。欢迎在Twitter上关注他：@BenWeiserNYT。 翻译：纽约时报中文网 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道郭文贵涉诈骗逾10亿美元在美被捕2023年3月16日 新冠病毒起源阴谋论背后的“推手”2020年11月20日 班农因涉诈骗美墨边境墙资金被捕2020年8月21日 爆料者郭文贵：权力、秘闻与谜团2018年1月10日 最受欢迎金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？ 阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市 深陷债务泥潭的中国地方政府为何仍大兴基建？ 台湾前总统马英九历史性访问中国大陆 FTX创始人被控向中国官员行贿4000万美元 TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话 中国副总理何立峰：主管经济的习近平忠诚追随者 从“中国制造”到“美国制造” 为什么“中国金融末日”没有成为现实 谎言、争吵和欺诈：乌克兰战争中不光彩的美国志愿者 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2023 The New York Times Company.

阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市Alibaba, China’s E-Commerce Giant, Will Split Into 6 UnitsDAISUKE WAKABAYASHI2023年3月29日 在创始人马云阔别一年后返回中国大陆的第二天，阿里巴巴宣布进行重组。 MARK SCHIEFELBEIN/ASSOCIATED PRESSChina’s Alibaba Group said on Tuesday that it would become a holding company with six different business groups, in a major reshuffle that signaled the potential breakup of the country’s biggest e-commerce firm. 中国的阿里巴巴集团周二宣布，它将成为一家拥有六个不同业务集团的控股公司。这次重大重组预示着中国最大的电子商务公司有解体的可能性。 Alibaba described the restructuring as the “most significant” organizational overhaul in its 24-year history. It said each unit would have its own chief executive and board of directors to allow for quicker decision-making. 阿里巴巴称此次重组是其24年历史上“最重要的一次组织变革”。它表示，重组后的每个部门都将有自己的首席执行官和董事会，以便更快地做出决策。 The units will be allowed to seek outside capital with an eye toward eventual initial public offerings. Only its China e-commerce unit, Taobao Tmall Commerce Group, will remain a wholly owned Alibaba entity. 这些由阿里巴巴控股的企业集团将被允许寻找外部资本，以期最终实现上市。只有其中国电子商务部门——淘宝天猫商业集团将继续由阿里巴巴全资拥有。 Alibaba’s U.S.-listed shares rose more than 14 percent on Tuesday. 阿里巴巴在美国上市的股票周二上涨了逾14%。 The experience of Alibaba, an internet conglomerate with a variety of businesses that include online shopping and cloud computing, has become a cautionary tale for the cost of challenging China’s ruling Communist Party and the extent of Beijing’s campaign to curb the power of its technology giants. 阿里巴巴拥有在线购物和云计算等多项业务，这家互联网集团的经历已成为挑战中国执政的共产党会付出什么代价的警示故事，从中也可以看到中国政府遏制国内科技巨头影响力运动的力度之大。 Alibaba’s decision to potentially break up the company into several entities may also ease the government’s concerns about the concentration of power and influence among the country’s web giants. 阿里巴巴可能将公司拆分为几个实体的决定也许会缓解政府对权力和影响力集中在国内网络巨头手中的担忧。 “Splitting the company into different parts appears compatible with the general desire to avoid antitrust scrutiny, which has been an issue not just for Alibaba but for other companies in China” in recent years, said Graham Webster, the editor in chief of the DigiChina Project at the Stanford University Cyber Policy Center. 斯坦福大学网络政策中心“数字中国项目”主编魏光明(Graham Webster)表示：“将公司拆分成不同的部分似乎符合避免反垄断审查这一普遍愿望，这不仅是阿里巴巴一直要面对的问题，也是中国其他公司的问题。” “I would be surprised if that’s not at least partially in their minds,” he said, adding that there may also be some “business logic” to the restructuring. Mr. Webster noted that splitting Alibaba into different lines of business could insulate the entire enterprise from future government crackdowns on specific sectors. 他说：“如果他们没有一点这样的想法，我会感到惊讶。”他还说，重组背后可能也有一些“商业逻辑”。魏光明指出，将阿里巴巴拆分为不同的业务线可以使整个企业免受政府未来对特定行业的打击。 For now, the government appears to be relaxing its regulatory stronghold on the technology sector after a tumultuous three years — a period marked by the disappearance of Alibaba’s billionaire founder, Jack Ma, from the public eye. He was driven underground after criticizing Chinese regulators in 2020 for stifling innovation at Ant Group, Alibaba’s financial technology sister company. 目前，政府似乎正在对科技行业松绑。政府的监管已让该行业度过了动荡的三年，其中一个标志是阿里巴巴的亿万富翁创始人马云从公众视野中消失。他曾在2020年批评中国监管机构扼杀阿里巴巴金融科技姊妹公司蚂蚁集团的创新，之后他被迫消声觅迹。 Once a gregarious and outspoken figure, a symbol of China’s ability to compete globally, Mr. Ma has maintained a low profile in recent years, choosing to spend most of his time abroad. The whereabouts of Mr. Ma, China’s most famous businessman, had become a source of intrigue. 马云曾是个爱交际且直言不讳的人，是中国全球竞争力的象征。但近年来他一直保持低调，选择把大部分时间花在国外。中国最著名的商人马云在哪里的问题曾一度引发人们的好奇心。 He resurfaced in mainland China this week after a prolonged absence. It is not clear how the timing of Mr. Ma’s return affected Alibaba’s announcement. He retired from the company in 2019 but remains one of its largest individual shareholders. 本周，销声匿迹了很长时间的马云在中国大陆再次露面。目前尚不清楚马云重现的时间对阿里巴巴的宣布有什么影响。虽然他已在2019年从公司退休，但仍是公司最大的个人股东之一。 After Mr. Ma’s remarks in 2020, Chinese officials suspended Ant Group’s plans for an initial public offering. Chinese regulators forced Ant to register as a financial holding company and to separate its payment app from its financial services. The public listing never took place. Subsequently, regulators fined Alibaba $2.8 billion for abusing its dominance. 马云在2020年发表了批评言论后，中国官员暂停了蚂蚁集团的首次公开募股计划。中国监管机构迫使蚂蚁金服注册为金融控股公司，并将其支付应用与其金融服务分开。蚂蚁集团至今仍未上市。那之后，监管机构对阿里巴巴开出182亿元的罚单，理由是公司滥用市场支配地位。 In January, Ant Group said Mr. Ma had planned to relinquish control of the company. Around the same time, the top Communist Party official at China’s central bank said the so-called rectification campaign into the biggest technology companies was “basically complete.” 今年1月，蚂蚁集团表示，马云已计划放弃对公司的控制股权。大约在同一时间，中国央行的最高中共官员宣布，针对大型科技公司的所谓整改运动“已基本完成”。 Mr. Ma’s disappearance illustrated how business interests had taken a back seat to the priorities of the state under Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, and how even its most powerful companies were not immune from scrutiny. But as China’s economy struggles to regain momentum after relaxing its restrictive "Zero Covid" policies, Beijing is trying to convince business leaders that it is focused on jump-starting the economy. 马云的销声匿迹显示，在中国最高领导人习近平的领导下，商业利益已不再是国家的优先事项，即使是最有权势的公司也不能免于遭受审查。但随着中国经济在政府放松了严格的“新冠清零”政策后努力恢复增长势头，政府正在试图说服商界领袖们相信，它的注意力正在转向经济增长的重启。 By allowing different businesses to spin off and possibly go public, Alibaba said, the move is “designed to unlock shareholder value.” The company’s stock is down roughly 70 percent since it became a target in the technology sector crackdown. 阿里巴巴称，将不同的业务分拆、让它们有可能独立上市的做法将“释放更大价值”。自从成为科技行业的打击目标以来，阿里巴巴的股票已下跌了约70%。 In a letter to employees, Daniel Zhang, Alibaba’s chief executive, said the holding company structure made sense for Alibaba because the natures of the six business groups were different, with various stages of development and disparate needs. Alibaba did not explain why Taobao Tmall, the China commerce business that accounts for the vast majority of its revenue, will remain wholly owned. 阿里巴巴首席执行官张勇在写给员工的信中表示，控股公司的管理模式对阿里巴巴来说是明智的，因为重组出来的六个业务集团的性质不同，发展阶段不同，需求也不同。阿里巴巴没有解释为什么占其收入绝大部分的电商业务淘宝天猫仍将由其全资拥有。 “If you do not embrace change, you will become rigid, and if you do not change yourself, you will be defeated by the times,” Mr. Zhang wrote. “不拥抱变化就会变得僵化，不改变自身就会被时代打败，”张勇写道。 In addition to being the head of the holding company, Mr. Zhang said, he will also serve as chief executive of the Cloud Intelligence Group, the company’s cloud computing and artificial intelligence division. 除了担任控股公司的负责人外，张勇说，他还将担任公司对云计算和人工智能部门重组后成立的阿里云智能集团的首席执行官。 The other business groups are Global Digital Commerce Group, its overseas e-commerce businesses; Local Services Group for its mapping and delivery services; Cainiao Smart Logistics, its logistics and supply chain management arm; and Digital Media and Entertainment Group. 其他部门重组后将成立从事国际数字商业的“外海数字商业集团”，提供地图和快递服务的“本地生活集团”，从事物流和供应链管理业务的“菜鸟集团”，以及经营数字媒体的“文娱集团”。 The move and the stated rationale behind it are similar to Google’s decision in 2015 to create a holding company under the Alphabet umbrella to allow its various business ventures to operate more independently. 阿里巴巴对重组及其背后理由的阐述类似于谷歌2015年作出成立Alphabet控股公司、让旗下的各种业务能更独立地运营的决定。 While China cracked down on its tech firms, other governments were also scrutinizing giants of the digital economy. In the United States, the federal government has sued Google and Meta, Facebook’s parent company, arguing that they have abused or maintained monopoly power. The European Union is preparing to carry out a sweeping antitrust law focused on American tech platforms. 在中国打击科技公司的同时，其他国家政府也在审查数字经济的巨头。在美国，联邦政府已起诉谷歌和Facebook的母公司Meta，称它们滥用或维护垄断实力。欧盟正准备实施一项针对美国科技平台的全面反垄断法。 James A. Lewis, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the effective breakup of Alibaba could influence efforts to check the power of tech giants in the United States and Europe. 战略与国际研究中心高级副主任詹姆斯·刘易斯表示，遏制美国和欧洲科技巨头实力的努力可能会受到阿里巴巴实际分拆的影响。 “One thing to ask is, What’s the precedent here for the U.S.?” he said. “There’s this regulatory interplay — what one party does affects the other two.” “要问的是，这件事对美国有何影响？”他说。“这种监管上的相互影响是存在的——一方的行为会影响另外两方。” David McCabe对本文有报道贡献。 Daisuke Wakabayashi是时报驻亚洲商业记者，常驻首尔。欢迎在Twitter上关注他：@daiwaka。 翻译：纽约时报中文网 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道马云“消失”为中国富豪带来的启示2021年4月22日 中国为何向马云“开战”？2020年12月28日 最受欢迎金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？ 阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市 深陷债务泥潭的中国地方政府为何仍大兴基建？ 台湾前总统马英九历史性访问中国大陆 FTX创始人被控向中国官员行贿4000万美元 TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话 中国副总理何立峰：主管经济的习近平忠诚追随者 从“中国制造”到“美国制造” 为什么“中国金融末日”没有成为现实 谎言、争吵和欺诈：乌克兰战争中不光彩的美国志愿者 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2023 The New York Times Company.