金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？Can the U.S. See the Truth About China?DAVID MARCHESE2023年3月29日 PHOTO ILLUSTRATION BY BRÁULIO AMADOJust like relationships between people, relationships between countries can all too easily be built on a foundation of unintentional misunderstandings, faulty assumptions and predigested truths. In her forthcoming, at times provocative and disquieting book, “The New China Playbook,” Keyu Jin, a professor at the London School of Economics and a board member at Credit Suisse, is trying to rework the foundation of what she sees as the West’s deeply flawed understanding of China’s economy, its economic ambitions and its attitude toward global competition. And through that work, Jin wants to help improve the frosty relationship between the country and its presumed geo-political opponents. “We’re in an incredibly dangerous world right now,” says Jin, who was born in Beijing and earned her Ph.D. in economics from Harvard and whose father, Jin Liqun, served as a vice minister of finance for China. “Without more effort made to understand each other’s perspectives, peaceful coexistence may not be possible.” (Jin joined the Credit Suisse board in 2022, not long after the bank was shaken by a series of scandals and losses. After this interview was conducted, the bank was sold to UBS, another Swiss bank. Through a spokes-person, Jin declined to comment on Credit Suisse’s situation.) 就像人与人之间的关系那样，国家之间的关系也很容易建立在无意的误解、错误的假设，以及过于简化的事实基础上。伦敦政治经济学院教授、瑞士信贷董事会成员金刻羽即将出版新书《新的中国战略手册》(The New China Playbook)，在这本有时具有煽动性、有时令人不安的书中，她试图重建西方与中国关系的基础，她认为西方对中国经济、中国的经济野心，以及中国如何看待全球竞争的理解存在严重缺陷。金刻羽希望通过这种重建来帮助改善中国与其假定的地缘政治对手之间的冷淡关系。金刻羽在北京出生，在哈佛大学获得了经济学博士学位，她的父亲金立群曾任中国财政部副部长。“我们正处在一个极其危险的世界中，”她说。“如果不做出更大努力来了解彼此的观点，和平共处恐怕是不可能的。”（金刻羽2022年加入瑞士信贷董事会，之后不久，这家银行因一系列丑闻和亏损濒临崩溃。瑞士信贷已在这次采访之后被另一家瑞士银行瑞银收购。金刻羽通过一名发言人拒绝对瑞士信贷的情况置评。） What do U.S. policymakers just not get about China’s economy and the Communist Party leadership’s thinking about competition with America? China’s current economic challenge is to overcome its middle-income trap, something that the United States might not relate to. It’s not all about displacing the United States as global hegemon, which would come with a huge amount of burdens and responsibilities. And I don’t think China is ready or willing to do that. To see China solely as trying to displace the United States is only going to stoke more fears. The United States can come up with better policies regarding real national-security concerns, but the government is doing things that to us are so un-American, like reducing the number of visas issued or curbing investment in China and Chinese investment in America. That doesn’t seem to be the spirit of collaboration. But understanding where China is coming from would be a step forward. 关于中国经济以及中共领导人如何看待中美竞争，美国的决策者究竟存在怎样的误解？中国当前的经济挑战是克服中等收入陷阱，这也许是美国不了解的东西。这不都是关于要取代美国成为全球霸主，那会给中国带来巨大的负担和责任。我不认为中国已经做好准备或愿意承担那些责任。将中国仅仅视为试图取代美国的国家只会引发更多的恐惧。虽然美国可以就真正的国家安全担忧拿出更好的政策，但在我们看来，美国政府正在做的事情太不符合美国价值了，比如减少发放签证数量，或限制美国对中国以及中国对美国的投资。这似乎不是合作精神。但了解中国的出发点将是一个进步。 Do you see large-scale Chinese industrial espionage as inhibiting that understanding? There are thorny issues between the two countries, and the more they trade, the more issues there are. But we want to see China as dynamic. It has changed a great deal. China liked to take the shortcuts in the beginning. It wanted to become an innovator, and it wanted to become great. But there was not a complete legal framework or rules and laws in place. China changed so it could join the World Trade Organization. Interestingly enough, these so-called technology transfers, or the misappropriation you mentioned — lots of industry studies show that they don’t work as effectively as they were supposed to. Instead, for example, in the electric-vehicle sector, where everybody started from the same place, China was able to leapfrog. Lots of companies say that even at the risk of technological misappropriation, China is too lucrative a market to pass over. They would rather take the risk. 你认为中国的大规模工业间谍活动是这种了解的障碍吗？中美两国之间有很多棘手的问题，而且贸易越多，问题也越多。但我们想动态地看中国。中国已发生了很大的变化。中国开始时喜欢走捷径，想成为一个创新者，想变得伟大。但没有一个完整的法律框架或可用的规则和法律。中国为加入世界贸易组织有所改变。有趣的是，许多行业研究表明，这些所谓的技术转让，或者你所说的盗用，并不像预期的那样有效。反而是在大家都从同一个地方起步的领域，例如电动汽车，中国能跨越式发展。许多公司说，即使存在技术盗用的风险，中国市场的利润也丰厚到不可错过的程度。他们宁愿冒那个险。 金刻羽2018年在慕尼黑的一场会议上。 GANDALF HAMMERBACHER/PICTURE-ALLIANCEIt seems pretty apparent that President Xi Jinping is moving away from the United States and the European Union and toward other countries with politically similar systems, like Russia or Iran. But those countries are unlikely to be economic partners for China on the level of the U.S. or the E.U. What are the implications of that shift for China’s longer-term economic growth? China has a slightly different world vision from the U.S. and maybe from Europe, which is coexistence of different political systems, different economic systems, a multipolar world — I think that’s one of China’s global agendas. Of course, intereconomically, there is much more trade. China still upholds this view of globalization, but geopolitics is making this increasingly difficult. So I would argue that at the same time it seeks this multipolar balance, it is slightly pushed to become closer to some of these countries that you mentioned. 很明显，习近平主席正在远离美国和欧盟，转向其他政治体制相似的国家，比如俄罗斯或者伊朗。但这些国家不太可能成为中国在美国或欧盟那种层面上的经济伙伴。这种转变对中国的长期经济增长有什么影响？中国的世界观与美欧略有不同，即不同的政治制度、不同的经济制度共存，以及世界的多极化——我认为这是中国的全球议程之一。当然，从经济上讲，要有更多的贸易。中国仍然坚持这种全球化观点，但地缘政治使之变得越来越困难。所以我认为，在寻求这种多极平衡的同时，它也稍微受到了推动，与你提到的这些国家当中的一些走得更近。 But what’s pushing China toward more closely aligning with Russia if not political affinity? To be very frank, it’s hard to say, “Let’s hold hands with Europe and the United States,” after the increasing tension, the export controls, the view that somehow the United States wants to limit China’s development and advancement in technology innovation. People believe that there was demonization of China early in the pandemic; there was aggressive rhetoric during Donald Trump’s presidency. It’s more difficult after that happens to say, “OK, let’s work on things like Russia and Ukraine.” Russia — and I’m not an expert on these issues — presents some security concerns for China. The Chinese people believe that a substantially weakened Russia might not be in the interest of China, because if there were the sense that the United States needed to seek out an opponent, China would be next. Not an easy answer there. 但是，如果不是政治上的认同，是什么在推动中国与俄罗斯更紧密地结盟呢？非常坦率地说，经过了紧张局势加剧、出口管制、认为美国在某种程度上想限制中国在技术创新方面的发展和进步之后，中国很难说出“让我们与欧洲和美国携手吧”。人们认为，大流行早期出现了对中国的妖魔化；唐纳德·特朗普在担任总统期间发表了侵略性言论。发生这种情况后，再说“好吧，让我们一起处理俄罗斯和乌克兰这样的问题”就更困难了。俄罗斯问题——我不是这些方面的专家——给中国带来了一些安全考量。中国人认为，一个大幅削弱的俄罗斯可能不符合中国的利益，因为如果人们觉得美国需要寻找一个对手，那么中国将是下一个。这不是一个三言两语就能说清楚的问题。 But to be honest, one of the things that I found most interesting — or perplexing — about your book was what felt like an elision of moral questions about how China operates. For example, you say there’s room for a vibrant debate on Chinese social media. But China is consistently ranked near the bottom when it comes to media freedom. Or you write that the Chinese people are generally willing to trade security for freedom. Were the Uyghurs willing to make that trade? The book also doesn’t mention the human rights questions raised by the hukou system and the way it treats rural residents. I’m trying to understand your perspective on these issues, because to me they seem connected to economics. I appreciate these questions. One reason it’s probably not thoroughly addressed is because my book is about economics and political economy. I wanted to touch upon points where there were surveys and data. These other subjects require more expertise and more thorough research, which I haven’t done. For sure, there’s much more control over media than in the past. I was pointing out in the book, though, that social media is used for two-way monitoring. There was a lot of criticism about government; there were protests last year over land seizures. These were not hidden. But the Chinese government does exhibit a great deal of paternalism. Officials think that a public narrative that is uncontrolled can lead to instability or more divisiveness. I’m not saying that the people prefer it that way, but when they’re asked about a trade-off between security and freedom, surveys show a vast difference from, say, the average U.S. citizen. Then you touched upon the huge issues of the migrant workers, the minorities in China. There are hundreds of millions people who could be in a better position, but things are changing. These are enduring challenges. On the one hand, yes, there’s more control, less liberty. On the other hand, there is an improving situation for people with more dire situations. 但是说实话，我发现你的书中最有趣——或者说最令人困惑——的其中一点是，感觉你回避了对中国如何运作的道德问题。例如，你说在中国的社交媒体上有一个充满活力的辩论空间。但在媒体自由方面，中国的排名一直接近垫底。或者你写道，中国人民通常愿意用安全换取自由。维吾尔人愿意做这种交易吗？书中也没有提到户口制度，以及它对待农村人口的方式所引起的人权问题。我想了解你对这些问题的看法，因为对我来说，它们似乎与经济有关。谢谢你的问题。这个问题可能没有彻底讨论的一个原因是，我的书是关于经济和政治经济学的。我想讨论有调查和数据的东西。其他这些课题需要更多的专业知识和更彻底的研究，而我还没有做这些工作。可以肯定的是，现在对媒体的控制比过去多得多。不过，我在书中指出，社交媒体被用于双向监督。有很多对政府的批评；去年发生了与征地相关的抗议活动。这些都没有被隐藏。但中国政府确实表现出了大量的家长式作风。官员们认为，不受控制的公共叙事会导致不稳定或更多的分裂。我并不是说人民喜欢这种方式，但当他们被问及安全和自由之间的权衡时，调查显示，结果与普通美国公民有很大的不同。然后你提到中国的农民工和少数民族这个大问题。数以亿计的人处境本可以更好，但情况正在发生变化。这些是持久的挑战。一方面，是的，有更多的控制，更少的自由。另一方面，对于处境更糟糕的人来说，情况也在改善。 The treatment of the Uyghurs doesn’t quite fit the framework of an improving situation. David, I understand. This particular subject is something where I have so little information and I don’t know what’s going on and there’s so many different accounts. I prefer not to comment on this and be irresponsible. But it is open for visits now. I think people should go take a look, then make a judgment on their own. It’s a complex situation. There are improvements, there are deteriorations, and we have to recognize that. 维吾尔人的待遇并不完全符合改善状况的框架。戴维，我理解。对于这个特定的主题，我所掌握的信息太少，我不知道发生了什么，而且有这么多不同的说法。我宁愿不对此发表不负责任的评论。但现在那里已经对外人开放了。我认为人们应该去看一看，然后自己做出判断。这是一个复杂的情况。有改善，也有恶化，我们必须承认这一点。 Do you feel inhibited in your ability to be critical of China? I’m an economist at the end of the day, and the way I’m trained, we like to say, “OK, where is the evidence?” That’s how I like to focus my analysis. Where there are policy mistakes, I’d be more than happy to share my views. There are more courageous people and more experts who can do that. What I’m trying to accomplish is using a different lens to focus on economic issues. 你是否感觉自己批评中国的能力受到了压制？归根结底，我是经济学家，根据我接受的训练，我们喜欢说，“好吧，证据在哪里？”这就是我分析的重点所在。在政策出现错误的地方，我非常乐意分享我的观点。有更多勇敢的人和更多专家可以做到这一点。我想要实现的是用不同的视角来关注经济问题。 You mentioned the trade-offs that people are willing to make within different political systems, which you also write about in the book: “Despite the limits China imposes on free-market forces, the absence of a free press, independent judicial system and the individual right to vote, we see there are other mechanisms in place to respond to the needs of its citizens and to address the threats posed by inequality.” That “despite” is doing a lot of work. It reminds me of that line, “Other than that, how was the play, Mrs. Lincoln?” I was trying to say that those are all things that we believe to be essential for sustained economic growth. I was saying that despite all that, China still performed well. I wasn’t necessarily suggesting that the things you mentioned weren’t important. I was more framing it as the puzzle of China’s economic growth. I was trying to say that those are all things that we believe to be essential for sustained economic growth. I was saying that despite all that, China still performed well. But I will say that the model that worked for China when it was building factories is not going to be the system that would work for innovation, where you need people to be able to get rich, where you need solid intellectual-property protection, where you have to have clear and transparent policies and rule of law. That worked in the last era. Doesn’t necessarily work in the new era. 你提到人们在不同的政治制度下愿意做出的权衡，你在书中还写道：“尽管中国对自由市场力量施加了限制，缺乏新闻自由、独立的司法系统和个人投票权，但我们看到还有其他机制可以回应公民的需求，并应对不平等带来的威胁。”这个“尽管”非常重要。这让我想起了那句台词，“除此之外，林肯夫人，这出戏怎么样？”（意为忽略重点——译注）我想说的是，这些都是我们认为对经济保持持续增长至关重要的事情。我是说尽管如此，中国仍然表现良好。我并不是说你提到的事情不重要。我倾向于将其描述为中国经济增长之谜。但我要说的是，在中国建立工厂时起作用的模式不会适用于创新体系，在创新中，你需要人们能够致富，你需要坚实的知识产权保护，在这方面你必须有清晰透明的政策和法治。这在上个时代行得通。不一定适用于新时代。 Let’s turn the lens of your book around: What are the biggest blind spots the Chinese leadership has when it comes to understanding American policies toward the country? I think the Chinese leaders have this notion that the United States is doing everything it can to try to stop China from growing. Or they believe that whatever China does is not going to elicit more trust. So I think this blind spot is that the leadership is convinced that there’s no way out of this. I’m not sure that is the case. And then also, the United States thinks that China wants to displace it. 让我们换一个角度看你的书：在理解美国对华政策方面，中国领导人的最大盲点是什么？我认为中国领导人有这样一种观念，即美国正在竭尽全力阻止中国的发展。或者他们认为，无论中国做什么，都不会赢得更多信任。所以我认为这个盲点是，领导层确信这方面没有解决办法。我不觉得是这样。此外还有，美国认为中国想要取代它。 Doesn’t it? No. China thinks that its economy should be the largest in the world, not because it’s rich but because it’s large: 1.4 billion people! But that’s very different from overtaking the United States in terms of innovative power and military power and real economic power. I don’t think anybody believes that is a realistic goal for China. Again, we have very different understandings of how we see each other. 不是吗？不是的。中国认为它的经济应该是世界上最大的，不是因为它富有，而是因为它很大：14亿人！但这与在创新能力、军事实力和实际经济实力方面超越美国截然不同。我觉得没有人会认为这对中国来说是一个现实的目标。同样，我们对如何看待彼此有非常不同的理解。 金刻羽（右二）2020年在瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛。GREG BEADLE/WORLD ECONOMIC FORUMWhat specific things, besides stopping industrial espionage, could China do to increase trust? Giving American companies, financial institutions, more opportunities to make money, opening up its various sectors more aggressively — that will allow more dialogue, more cooperation. That’s one thing. Second, it’s understandable for the United States to push back on some of the industrial espionage. But China’s best technologies, the ones that are really successful right now, artificial intelligence or batteries or its payment system — all of that is based on domestic competition. The industrial espionage stems from a lack of appreciation from the start of intellectual property, and the United States, by pushing China to do more intellectual-property protection, is actually good for China. I think it’s on a substantial downward trend, this misappropriation of technologies, because it’s actually not good for China’s own goals. 除了制止工业间谍活动，中国还可以采取哪些具体措施来增强信任？给美国公司、金融机构更多赚钱的机会，更积极地开放各个领域——这将使得出现更多的对话、更多的合作。这是一方面。其次，美国抵制一些工业间谍活动是可以理解的。但中国最好的技术，目前真正成功的技术，人工智能或电池或其支付系统——所有这些都基于国内竞争。工业间谍源于一开始对知识产权缺乏重视，而美国通过推动中国加强知识产权保护，实际上对中国有利。我认为这种盗用技术的情况呈大幅下降趋势，因为这实际上不利于中国自己的目标。 The next question is more of an epistemological one. The animating idea of your book is that people see the same situation from different perspectives. So when you hear my skepticism about things like Chinese labor policy or media freedom being treated benignly, do you hear it as my being stuck in a particular ideological paradigm? Or maybe that my thinking is itself an example of the misunderstandings that the book is trying to address? I totally understand, because the first time I came to the United States in 1997, my classmates were asking me about human rights in Tibet. In China, meanwhile, we were busy building and developing and reforming. The focal points have been different. That’s not to say that the economic means justify the unfortunate circumstances. But China is a country that has done the most economically for the most number of people in the shortest amount of time. If you look at the new generation, they are open-minded on a whole range of issues, so much more than their parents. They care about animal rights, worker rights, social inequity. That shift gives us hope that China will progress. 下一个问题更像是一个认识论问题。在你的书里，人们从不同的角度看待相同的情况，这是一个生动的立意。那么，当你听到我对中国的劳工政策或媒体自由受到尊重等问题持怀疑态度时，你是否认为我陷入了一种特定的意识形态范式？或者说，我的想法也许本身就是一个示例，是这本书试图消除的误解之一？我完全理解，因为1997年我第一次来美国时，同学们问我西藏的人权问题。与此同时，在中国，我们忙于建设、发展和改革。关注点不同。这并不是说经济手段可以证明不幸的事情是合理的。但是中国是一个在经济方面用最短的时间为最多人做出努力的国家。如果你看看新一代，他们在一系列问题上都持开放态度，比他们的父辈要开放得多。他们关心动物权利、工人权利和社会不平等。这种转变让我们对中国的进步充满希望。 图片来源：金刻羽 这篇采访对两次对话进行了编辑和浓缩。 David Marchese是《纽约时报杂志》的特约撰稿人，也是Talk专栏的撰稿人。他最近就离开YouTube采访了Emma Chamberlain，就一个更愚蠢的美国采访了Walter Mosley ，就一种新的工作方式采访了Cal Newport。 翻译：纽约时报中文网 点击查看本文英文版。 相关报道习近平领导下的中国逐渐远离世界2023年3月24日 中俄友谊凸显北京对西方“遏制”的恐惧2023年3月23日 美国情报机构就中国威胁发出警告2023年3月9日 美国扩大美印合作，对抗中国技术崛起2023年2月1日 最受欢迎金刻羽：美国真的能理解中国吗？ 阿里巴巴将分拆为六个业务集团，均可独立融资上市 深陷债务泥潭的中国地方政府为何仍大兴基建？ 台湾前总统马英九历史性访问中国大陆 FTX创始人被控向中国官员行贿4000万美元 TikTok上什么最火？为周受资说话 中国副总理何立峰：主管经济的习近平忠诚追随者 从“中国制造”到“美国制造” 为什么“中国金融末日”没有成为现实 谎言、争吵和欺诈：乌克兰战争中不光彩的美国志愿者 国际 中国 商业与经济 镜头 科技 科学 健康 教育 文化 风尚 旅游 房地产 观点与评论 免费下载 纽约时报中文网 iOS 和 Android App 点击下载iOS App点击下载Android App点击下载Android APK © 2023 The New York Times Company.